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3How corrupt is local government in the UK? 
In our 2011 assessment of Corruption in the UK,1 we found a considerable degree of 
public concern about corruption in local government. This was reinforced by anecdotal 
evidence of corruption, particularly in relation to procurement, social housing and the 
planning system – an impression strengthened by the occasional high-profile case of 
local government corruption reported in the media. 
Paradoxically, there seemed to be little evidence of widespread corruption taking place, 
other than these high-profile cases. There might be many explanations for this, such  
as under-reporting, a prevalence of low-level corruption that is not investigated and  
poor scrutiny mechanisms – or, indeed, that there is relatively little corruption in UK  
local government.
A notable feature of researching this report has been the lack of agreement among 
the many experts we consulted about the scale and prevalence of corruption in UK 
local government. Some argued that the cases that have come to light represent 
the tip of the iceberg. Others felt equally strongly that the relatively small number of 
obvious corruption cases, and the fact that they had often been exposed by the existing 
oversight structures, was a sign that there is in fact no iceberg.
This report sets out to shed light on this paradox. Our intention is not to prove that 
corruption exists in local government, nor is it an investigative inquiry into cases of 
corruption. We deliberately avoid making a judgement on the levels of corruption in local 
government, as we do not feel the evidence exists to make such a judgement. Rather, 
we have undertaken an analysis of the institutional robustness and integrity of local 
government – looking at the safeguards against corruption and the rapid and substantial 
changes to this regime instituted by the current UK Government.
Here, a disturbing picture emerges, and one on which experts and interviewees were 
agreed. On the one hand, the conditions are present in which corruption is likely 
to thrive – low levels of transparency, poor external scrutiny, networks of cronyism, 
reluctance or lack of resource to investigate, outsourcing of public services, significant 
sums of money at play and perhaps a denial that corruption is an issue at all. On the 
other hand, the system of checks and balances that previously existed to limit corruption 
has been eroded or deliberately removed. These changes include the removal of 
independent public audit of local authorities, the withdrawal of a universal national code 
of conduct, the reduced capacity of the local press and a reduced potential scope to 
apply for freedom of information requests. We have identified 16 areas in which we find 
a marked decline in the robustness of local government to resist corruption.
     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
‘Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ 
[Transparency International]
1.  Corruption in the UK, 4 vols, Transparency International UK, London, June 2011
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4In some areas, key institutional defences to ensure resilience against corruption risks 
have been removed through recent legislative reforms. In other areas, the decline in 
institutional robustness is a by-product of other trends such as the changing nature of 
the media and the trend towards outsourcing.  Either way, the current and proposed 
arrangements represent a change that may be inadequate to protect the public and the 
public purse. Of course, many of these are recent changes, and we do not yet know 
what the result will be. However, a lesson Transparency International has learnt across 
the world is that it is better to take notice of emerging risks and to act early, because 
once corruption takes root it can be very hard to eradicate.
We note that many of the Government’s recent changes apply only to England. 
However, we believe that much of our report’s analysis and many of the 
recommendations are relevant to local government throughout the UK. They should 
also act as a warning signal to other parts of the UK to ensure that corruption risk is 
assessed before making any changes similar to those instituted in England.
We feel it is important to emphasise, as has been noted in a number of public 
consultations and inquiries, that the majority of local councillors and council officers 
observe high standards of conduct and very few misuse their positions to further their 
own ends. There is no substitute for a commitment to ethics and integrity in public 
service. However, when accountability is absent, public officials may exercise their 
power for private ends unchecked by scrutiny, complaint, or the threat of punishment. 
Clear opportunities exist for unethical officers and members to exploit public trust for 
private gain. In any sector, corruption tends to increase as oversight and enforcement 
are weakened. 
Even under historic arrangements, unethical local politicians and officials have engaged 
in corruption resulting in cost to the public purse, damage to trust in local politics, and 
in direct harm to citizens and public services. For those who are actively seeking the 
opportunities for corruption, perhaps most notably organised criminals, the changes 
will provide a greater opportunity to exploit the many valuable corruption opportunities 
inherent in the local government. 
Irrespective of how much corruption currently occurs, we believe that under the new and 
proposed arrangements for local government, corruption is likely to increase and there 
will be less reporting of that corruption. 
How big is the problem – and where does it occur? 
The scarcity of data makes it impossible to build a real picture of how much corruption 
there is in UK local government. This is in line with other institutions like the NHS and 
prison service, where data capture and record keeping on corruption are weak. In fact, 
with no central institution responsible for the collection and analysis corruption data in 
the UK, and the probable reduction in detection of local government corruption owing to 
changes affecting internal audit, external audit and investigations, the opaque picture is 
unlikely to become clearer. Unless there is a concerted effort to collect and categorise 
corruption-related information, we will be no more able to assess the scale of local 
government corruption in the future. 
Our report is therefore unable to answer some important questions about corruption 
in UK local government, including the scale and prevalence, regional variations and 
whether corruption is worse in local government than in other sectors or institutions. At 
times, the case study evidence we use consists of unproven allegations. We use such 
examples to illustrate how corruption might occur, and not with any intent of supporting 
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5the allegations. It is a feature of researching corruption in any institution that the 
problem is concealed by the participants, and so hard evidence is scarce. An important 
recommendation of this report is that such information and evidence that is available 
should be collated at national level.  
Notwithstanding the methodological difficulties encountered by our research team, 
it is clear that corruption in local government does exist. This should come as no 
surprise, as the sector employs millions of people, has a large budget, and is involved 
in millions of transactions each week. Indeed, local government is inherently exposed 
to a number of corruption risks. Public officials enjoy considerable discretionary powers 
and monopoly over public services such as health, education, housing, land, water and 
sewage. High levels of bureaucracy combined with closer interactions at the point of 
service delivery can provide opportunities for corruption, bribery and extortion. Local 
power structures, party affiliations and social networks, combined with a multiplicity 
of interaction points between the public and private sector, quite apart from the 
involvement of organised crime, provide a rich backdrop for corruption pressure. 
We have identified twelve areas in which local government is particularly vulnerable 
to corruption. These are outlined in section 2. They relate to procedures for awarding 
public contracts and overseeing their implementation, as well as to new risks arising 
from the growing tendency to outsource service provision and the transfer of personnel 
between public and private roles that this entails. Planning decisions remain highly 
discretionary and are vulnerable to corruption in several areas. Councillors and officers 
have opportunities to collude in social housing fraud. And the new system of individual 
electoral registration will bring new opportunities for corruption.
In terms of significant examples, this report sets out historical cases of:
• Bribery in local government, such as in the case of a councillor in the West Country 
who was recorded making claims that he could obtain planning permission in return 
for payment;
• Collusion, such as the construction contracts bid-rigging scandal in local 
government after which the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) issued penalties to 103 
companies worth a total of £129.5 million;
• Conflicts of interest, such as that of former leader of Lincolnshire County Council 
who sought to influence the route of a new bypass so as to divert it through his own 
land for financial benefit;
• Corruption-related fraud, such as the case of the head of energy procurement for 
the Local Authority South East Region, who defrauded over 120 local authorities at 
a personal gain of around £400,000;
• Electoral corruption, such as the in the 2004 Birmingham local elections, when over 
1,500 votes cast were subsequently identified as fraudulent.
 
Of course, in many cases the impact cannot be measured in financial terms. Public 
safety might be compromised when an organised criminal gang corruptly obtain 
contracts for local services. A family badly in need of housing might be pushed down a 
waiting list because the cronies of a particular interest group have manipulated the list. A 
public amenity such as a local playground might be earmarked for building development 
when an influential member of the planning committee has a financial interest in the 
development.  
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6How is the situation changing? 
The Coalition Government has, since its formation in 2010, pursued a ‘localism agenda’. 
The previous Government’s central standards framework was regarded by the new 
administration as excessive, bureaucratic and a dampener on healthy local democracy. 
From August 2010, the Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government 
announced plans to disband the Audit Commission, transfer the work of the Audit 
Commission’s in-house practice into the private sector, put in place a new local audit 
framework, abolish the Standard Board regime and hand responsibility for ethical 
standards back to local authorities. The resulting Localism Act received Royal Assent 
in 2012. The Local Audit and Accountability Bill will finalise the reform process and is 
currently before Parliament. 
On the issue of localism specifically, we do not believe that there is a discernible link 
between localism and corruption outcomes in the UK. The decentralisation agenda is 
not necessarily in tension with counter-corruption efforts. However, it is a concern that 
oversight roles will be undermined, and that the removal of national-level codes and the 
ability to observe and react to the problem at national level increases corruption risk.
While the government may have good reasons for devolving powers to deliver services 
to the local level, relying on self-regulation of professional standards in local government 
is risky.  There is an inconsistency in the fact that the government is promoting 
centralisation of anti-corruption standards in the private sector, through the Guidance to 
the Bribery Act, while promoting decentralisation in the public sector.
A decentralised model that relies on local institutions and individuals to act as a check 
on the power of elected members runs the risk that those individuals will back away 
from challenging those in local power for fear that their jobs, promotion prospects 
or status in a political party will be jeopardised. Those who are given such oversight 
functions must be empowered to fulfil this role in practice. They need resources to carry 
out their responsibilities and the support of a robust framework so that they are not 
deterred from challenging concentrated and informal power networks. It is not clear that 
the support and resources are in place to enable this decentralisation of standards to be 
effective.
In addition, there are practical difficulties to decentralising the regulation of standards. 
The regulation of conduct requires specialist skills, knowledge, and legitimacy, and in 
some local areas there may be a lack of well-qualified or experienced people willing to 
engage in monitoring standards. Smaller councils, in particular, may lack the member 
and officer capacity to ensure that standards are upheld. 
A thorough and wide-ranging audit should be part of the system of checks and balances 
to counter corruption. We believe that the new system – in which local authorities 
themselves are solely responsible for awarding their audit contracts and where there is 
no back-stop support for auditors who are challenging the local authority – will narrow 
the scope and effectiveness of local audits, while increasing potential conflicts of 
interest. Other changes in the audit regime cause further concerns.
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7Increasing corruption risk as a result of recent changes
We have identified 16 changes in the new legislation and policy which we believe 
increase the corruption risk in local government.  
Audit arrangements
1. The independence of internal and external audit, and of monitoring officers, 
financial officers and chief executives, is weakened because there is no longer 
an Audit Commission to act as a backstop and provide support; 
2. There will be no institution with wider powers of public audit to enable criminal 
investigations, which the Audit Commission used to have;
3. There will be no institution to collect nationwide data on fraud and corruption  
or analyse trends;
4. New external audit reports will not be adequately covered by the Freedom of 
Information Act;
5. Local authorities will have a reduced internal capacity to investigate fraud and 
corruption, due to austerity measures;
6. The responsibility for investigating and detecting fraud and corruption is being 
delegated to lower-level officers;  
7. Audit committees are weakened and may disappear because there is no 
longer a statutory requirement for an audit committee to be a full committee in 
its own right;
8. External auditors appointed under the new arrangements may face incentives 
to avoid undertaking investigations or raising concerns about suspicions of 
fraud or corruption.
New regime for regulating the conduct of elected members:
9. There is no longer a universal code of conduct to provide clarity to members 
serving on different public authorities and committees;
10. There is no longer a requirement for members to declare gifts and hospitality 
and no legal requirement for either a standards committee or the monitoring 
officer to check any register of interests on a regular basis;
11. There is no longer a statutory requirement for a council to have a standards 
committee;
12. There is no longer any obligatory sanction for members that violate the local 
codes of conduct, with overreliance on party discipline as a sanction;
13. Since the abolition of Standards for England, there is no longer a national 
investigations body for misconduct;
14. Some local authorities may struggle to appoint the required independent 
persons of the appropriate calibre and legitimacy to perform the new role that 
has been created under the self-regulation system;
15. The system relies too heavily on the new offence of failing to declare a 
pecuniary interest – which is arguably unenforceable and misses the point that 
transparency is not sufficient to deter corruption;  
16. The ability of chief executives, financial officers and monitoring officers to hold 
elected members to account would be compromised by proposals to abolish 
their statutory employment protection.
8Who owns the problem? 
With the abolition of the Audit Commission and Standards for England, the potential 
abolition of Audit Committees within local authorities, and the downgrading of officials 
who deal with corruption, it is unclear who owns the problem both nationally and locally.
Under the new arrangements in England, the police are the main body with the 
responsibility to investigate corruption allegations. Yet this is fraught with difficulties, 
such that it is unlikely to work.
Investigating and proving corruption is one of the hardest tasks in criminal prosecutions, 
which is why investigating authorities usually require specialist teams and units to deal 
with it, armed with the appropriate investigative powers. Under the former regime, 
the Audit Commission had special powers and responsibilities to investigate financial 
misconduct and illegality including the right to require and seize records even from 
third parties and demand explanations from officers, councillors and even contractors 
and those working alongside local authorities. Importantly, it could produce Public 
Interest Reports to highlight corruption risks and issues without the need for the level 
of evidence that would be required by the Crown Prosecution Service. Under the new 
arrangements, an external auditor risks being sued if it tries to fulfil a similar role, even  
if the auditor had the appetite to do it, which is less likely given their commercial 
priorities and the expected relative reduction in the scope of audits.
There is strong reason to doubt that the police will devote resources to investigating 
possible violations or that the Crown Prosecution Service will consider it worthwhile 
to prosecute, especially in smaller cases. Police forces may not be able to justify an 
investigation as a good use of limited resources when, for example, it might turn out 
that a member simply forgot to declare an interest.  Further, police investigations will 
be much more difficult to initiate in the absence of evidence gathered from the external 
audit, and such evidence is less likely to be gathered as the scope of audits reduce. 
This is in addition to the police’s reduced capacity to investigate fraud and corruption in 
general as a result of austerity programmes affecting a range of police services. 
Overall, the new arrangements place a greater emphasis on the need for local 
authorities at senior level to take ownership of the issue of corruption, and for the 
police to have sufficient expertise and investigative capacity for crimes that they may 
not historically have investigated.  At national level, there is an apparent vacuum of 
ownership that needs to be filled. 
What are the conditions for success?
Transparency International’s wider research in the public sector indicates that among 
the key determinants of effectiveness in countering corruption are:
• A clear tone from the top and supportive institutional environment;
• Ownership and clear assigning of responsibilities;
• Effective assessment of corruption risks;
• The independence of the units or authorities whose duty is to prevent or investigate 
corruption;
• A supportive legal environment;
• Visible and effective whistleblowing mechanisms;
• The institutional will to mount effective investigation and prosecution of corruption;
• Strong sanctions implemented against those who are caught – both legal and other;
• A commitment to transparency.
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9Some of these factors, such as ownership of the problem, need to exist both within 
individual councils and at national level.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Action now, following the recommendations below, will help to reverse the descent 
into a situation in which local government corruption is likely to increase, and perhaps 
increase substantially.  The Government’s changes, without apparent consideration of 
the consequences for corruption, are likely to have unintended consequences.  The 
effect of the changes has been to create a situation in which corruption could thrive. 
Swift action is required to prevent this happening.  We do not believe that these 
recommendations will be sufficient to address all of the weaknesses in the system,  
new and historic. We do believe that they are a good starting point.
 
1. A clear tone from the top and supportive institutional environment 
Recommendation 1: Nolan Principles. Private companies, when operating services in 
the public interest, should be required to comply with the Nolan Principles.
Recommendation 2: Protection of anti-corruption officials. Legal employment 
protections should be maintained for key anti-corruption officials, including Chief 
Executives and Monitoring Officers, to prevent them being targeted by corrupt officials 
or elected members.
Recommendation 3: Audit Committees.  It should be a statutory requirement for a 
local authority to have an audit committee as a dedicated full committee, with a specific 
remit to oversee corruption risk assessments and corruption investigations.
Recommendation 4: Creation of an auditors’ forum on corruption. There should be 
a forum for private audit firms involved in local authority audit to share macro risks in the 
sector, identify trends, understand good and poor practice examples and, critically, draw 
attention to specific corruption issues – where evidence is below a Crown Prosecution 
standard – in a similar manner to Public Interest Reports under the previous system.
Recommendation 5: Research. Further research should be undertaken by the 
Government to give a clear picture of the prevalence and scale of corruption in UK local 
government.
2. Ownership and clear assigning of responsibilities 
Recommendation 6: Corruption accountability. Each local authority should have 
a nominated individual responsible for counter-corruption who conducts a regular 
corruption risk assessment and liaises closely with law enforcement authorities.
Key recommendation
The Government needs to review the changes that are taking place in local 
government to ensure that they do not inadvertently create an enabling environment 
for corruption. This will require – at a minimum – a corruption risk assessment, 
strengthened whistleblowing systems, enhanced audit procedures, extension of the 
Nolan Principles and Freedom of Information obligations to private sector services 
contracted out by local authorities, re-introduction of a common ethical standard and 
a willingness to adjust or amend other recent changes if that should prove necessary.
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Recommendation 7: Central oversight. Notwithstanding the localism agenda, it is 
critical that some element of central oversight is restored. At a minimum, this should 
involve data collection and consistent standards. 
3. Effective assessment of corruption risks 
Recommendation 8: National risk assessment. The Government should conduct 
a national-level assessment of corruption risk in local government, and take this into 
account when designing legislation, policies and procedures.
Recommendation 9: Local risk assessment. Each local authority should undertake a 
periodic corruption risk assessment in relation to its own functions and operations.
Recommendation 10: Reporting of procurement risks. There should be strict 
procedures requiring officers always to report (i) major price discrepancies among 
procurement bids and (ii) details of contract variations to the council’s Audit Committee 
and senior management.
4. The independence of the units or authorities whose duty is to prevent or 
investigate corruption 
Recommendation 11: Independence of auditors. Firms providing an audit function 
for local authorities should not be allowed to provide other commercial and consultancy 
services to the same local authority.
Recommendation 12: Internal audit teams. Internal investigations need to be 
adequately resourced and sufficiently independent.   Internal audit teams are vulnerable 
to manipulation by the corrupt, and this vulnerability increases if they are under-
resourced, unsupported by the leadership or have their terms of reference and freedom 
to investigate curtailed.
5. A supportive legal environment 
Recommendation 13: Regulating the revolving door. The rules should be tightened 
for ‘revolving door’ employment in the private sector, notably when officials and 
elected members have had access to confidential public service information.  Each 
local authority should be required to publish appropriate details of officials or elected 
members involved in the revolving door. 
Recommendation 14: Consistency of ethical standards.  A consistent and 
compulsory set of codes of conduct should be re-introduced to cover local authorities 
and other local services such as school boards and Fire & Rescue service boards, on 
which councillors often also sit. 
6. Visible and effective whistleblowing mechanisms 
Recommendation 15: Whistleblowing mechanisms. Whistleblowing has been more 
effective than audit, internal monitoring, or police investigations in revealing corruption 
in local government. Given the decline in other oversight mechanisms, confidential 
whistleblowing from local authority workers, as well as other reporting channels for 
citizens, elected officials and the private sector will play an even more important role. 
Suitable mechanisms should be established to provide an easy-to-use and confidential 
channel for reporting corruption suspicions or incidents.
11
7. The institutional will to mount effective investigation and prosecution of 
corruption 
Recommendation 16: Police investigative prioritising and capacity. Guidance 
and resources should be provided to ensure that there is sufficient police investigative 
capacity to monitor and investigate corruption issues at a local government level, 
including as part of any organised crime strategy.  
Recommendation 17: Creating a centre of expertise.  The police forces in England & 
Wales should consider creating a joint Public Sector Counter Corruption Unit, similar to 
the unit recently created in Scotland.
Recommendation 18: Greater monitoring of elected officials’ interests.  Elected 
members’ declared interests must be subject to monitoring and, where appropriate, 
investigation. 
Recommendation 19: Enforcement of Section 106 criteria. Section 106 criteria, 
which provide developers an opportunity to develop land in exchange for commitments 
to develop community projects, should be routinely enforced and any failure to enforce 
should be published in local authority audits. This research indicates that developers 
may be corrupting local authority officers to overlook their obligation to meet Section 
106 commitments.  
8. Strong sanctions implemented against those who are caught  
– both legal and other 
Recommendation 20: Sanctions for ethical breaches. Political parties should commit 
to a clear sanctions process for local politicians who have been identified as having 
breached ethical standards, recognising that even the appearance of impropriety can 
cause substantial damage to that party and the local authority in question.
9. A commitment to transparency 
Recommendation 21: Access for auditors to private contractors. Auditors should be 
allowed to access documents from significant private contractors that a local authority 
has used. 
Recommendation 22: Freedom of Information. Private companies, when operating 
services in the public interest, should be required to comply with the Freedom of 
Information Act with regards to those services.  For example, and specifically, audit 
reports from local authorities should be covered under the Freedom of Information Act 
or published directly as public documents.
Local government in the United Kingdom controls around one-quarter of public 
spending, contracts out an increasing amount of services to private providers, and is 
responsible for making decisions about a number of areas where the interests of private 
companies are often in tension with the wishes of the electorate. For all these reasons, 
local government is inherently exposed to a large number of corruption risks. Yet the 
accountability of local authorities is patchy. There is little scrutiny of their work by a 
largely emasculated local media, and the ballot box provides only feeble discipline given 
that turnout is low and in many areas one party dominates or seats go uncontested. 
Corruption scandals over the years have revealed that individuals are sometimes able 
to capture local politics, exercising informal power over the local party and their political 
group as well as council officers, so that they can shape policy to serve their own 
interests unchallenged by their peers. 
Moreover, recent legislative reforms under the Localism Act 2011 – and likely to pass 
in the Local Audit and Accountability Bill currently in Parliament – have removed key 
institutional defences to ensure resilience against these corruption risks, replacing them 
with arrangements that are highly likely to be inadequate to protect the public interest 
and the public purse. Under the new standards and audit frameworks, corruption 
is likely to increase while policy makers, the public and police will have much less 
information about how and where corruption is occurring in local government. 
Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain”. In local government, the public trusts elected council members and 
appointed council officers to carry out their duties in a way that serves the public 
interest. Corruption occurs when they use their power to influence decisions or policies 
or allocate funds in ways that they are not supposed to do and in order to achieve a 
private benefit. Corruption need not involve the exchange of money through explicit 
bribes. Individuals might be influenced to breach their duties by gifts or the promise 
of favours, or by the prospect of being rewarded in future, perhaps by a job offer or 
preferential treatment. 
Fraud is different to corruption. It is “the act of intentionally deceiving someone in order 
to gain an unfair or illegal advantage (financial, political or otherwise)”. Anyone can 
commit fraud regardless of whether they have been entrusted with power. However, 
when elected members and council officers collude in fraud, or are influenced to turn a 
blind eye to fraud, they act corruptly. 
According to one widely used model, corruption is most likely to occur in conditions 
where public officials have the opportunity to exercise discretion in a decision-making 
process or are the sole person responsible for a particular decision (they have 
discretionary and monopoly power), and when they perceive that their misconduct will 
not be detected or punished (there is a lack of accountability)2. When accountability is 
absent, public officials are able to exercise their power for private ends unchecked by 
scrutiny, complaint, or the threat of punishment. Transparency plays an important role 
in countering corruption, because when the public and the media are able to see how 
1.      INTRODUCTION
2. Klitgaard, Robert (1998) Controlling Corruption, University of California Press.
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officers and councillors make decisions, with whom they interact, and how they spend 
public money, it is easier to identify corruption and, in turn, more likely that individuals 
will be deterred from engaging in it.
In this report, we identify twelve areas where there is a risk that corruption will 
occur because individuals have excessive discretionary or monopoly power and 
sixteen areas where accountability structures have been gravely weakened as a 
result of recent and ongoing reforms. 
The inherent corruption risks relate to procedures for awarding public contracts 
and overseeing their implementation, as well as to new risks arising from the growing 
tendency to outsource service provision and the transfer of personnel between public 
and private roles that this entails. Planning decisions remain highly discretionary and 
are vulnerable to corruption in several areas. Councillors and officers have opportunities 
to collude in social housing fraud. And the new system of individual electoral registration 
will bring new opportunities for corruption.
It will be much harder to hold officers and councillors to account in future 
because the Government is abolishing the Audit Commission, and has replaced its 
broad responsibilities for public audit with a requirement for local authorities to contract 
out external audit to private providers. In addition, it has proposed removing statutory 
employment protection for key council officers in safeguard roles. The Government 
has also abolished the Standards Board regime, removed the statutory requirement for 
councils to have standards committees, and ended local authorities’ power to suspend 
members as a sanction for poor behaviour. 
While the Government may have good reasons for devolving powers to deliver services 
to the local level, relying on self-regulation of professional standards in local 
government is risky. In the local context, it is especially important that institutions 
and individuals with formal responsibilities to act as a check on the power of elected 
members are empowered to fulfil this role in practice. Individuals should not feel 
beholden to superiors or peers because they fear for their status in the local party, their 
jobs or their promotion prospects. They need resources to carry out their responsibilities 
and the support of a robust framework so that they are not deterred from challenging 
concentrated and informal power networks. In addition, there are practical difficulties to 
decentralising the regulation of standards. The regulation of conduct requires specialist 
skills, knowledge, and legitimacy, and in some local areas there is a dearth of well-
qualified or experienced people willing to engage in monitoring standards. Smaller 
councils in particular may lack the member and officer capacity to ensure that standards 
are upheld. 
The recent and proposed changes fundamentally erode the powers and independence 
of the bodies responsible for monitoring conduct. By doing so, they reduce our ability  
to deter, detect and punish misconduct. Without proper accountability, there is a risk  
that more members and officers in local government will exploit – and perhaps 
even seek out – opportunities to behave corruptly. There are also increased risks of 
organised and fraud focused criminals exploiting weaknesses in the system and actively 
seeking to induce corruption. The overall effect of the recent legislative reforms to local 
government oversight is likely to reduce the ability to prevent corruption at the local 
government in England. 
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The Government has also argued that formal and central institutions can be replaced 
by informal and local forms of accountability – for example, ‘armchair auditors’. Yet 
there is no evidence that this will emerge. Given the decline of the local press and the 
patchy nature of civil society activity on local issues, it cannot be taken for granted. The 
public does scrutinise some of the work of local government, particularly making use 
of Freedom of Information requests, and this scrutiny almost certainly helps to deter 
corrupt activity. However, the public does not by and large have the interest or capacity 
to monitor the conduct of local government to the depth necessary to hinder or detect 
fraud and corruption. Moreover, even if the public detects suspicious conduct, it does 
not have the investigative capacity to probe whether standards or rules have really been 
violated or any institution to which it can turn to make a formal objection or allegation 
(which would previously have required a response, in the form of either an investigation 
or a reason why no further action was required). 
It is too early to assess the impact of the new system. However, many experts 
interviewed for this project argued that local government will be more vulnerable to 
corruption under the new arrangements. The latest report from the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life considered the new arrangements for standards in local 
government, and concludes that, 
“The new, slimmed down arrangements have yet to prove themselves sufficient for 
their purpose. We have considerable doubt that they will succeed in doing so and 
intend to monitor the situation closely.” 3
This report is not based on investigations of corruption cases and does not attempt 
to measure the amount or cost of corruption in local government. Such tasks would 
require extensive resources, and corruption is by its nature difficult to research since 
the perpetrators have an interest in concealing it and often the power to do so as well. 
Our approach is rather to identify risk areas where corruption might easily occur and 
go undetected or unpunished. We do this by examining the robustness of institutional 
structures and analysing known cases studies of corruption, misconduct, allegations 
and scenarios informed by experience of real life events in local government, 
predominantly in England.This research is based on a review of relevant parliamentary 
debates, committee reports, government consultations, academic and international 
organisation research, and on 24 interviews conducted in person or by telephone with 
local government experts and stakeholders, including elected members, senior officers, 
auditors and academics. 
3. Committee on Standards in Public Life (2013) Standards Matter.
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Local government standards reform in the 2000s
Following a number of corruption scandals in the 1990s, the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life undertook an investigation into corruption in local 
government in 1997.4  Although the report uncovered isolated instances of 
corruption, it concluded that the majority of local councillors observed “high 
standards of conduct” and that very few had misused their positions to further their 
own ends. However, the Committee made a number of recommendations aimed 
at preventing local government corruption in the future. Many of these were taken 
up in the Local Government Act 2000, which introduced a framework for improving 
accountability in local government through a set of standards and procedures for 
checking the conduct of members. 
The Act established: 
• A statutory code of conduct covering elected and co-opted members who serve 
on a range of authorities. 
• Independently chaired statutory standards committees for each principal local 
authority, with the power to suspend members for up to six months. 
• An independent regulator of local authority standards, the Standards Board for 
England (later Standards for England), responsible for overseeing the code of 
conduct, maintaining an independent national overview of local investigations into 
allegations against members, and for investigating some allegations itself. 
• A separate independent body, the Adjudication Panel for England, to which the 
most serious cases could be referred; this body was able to disqualify members 
for up to five years. 
 
The Committee on Standards in Public Life took the view that these arrangements 
did much to improve the conduct of elected members of local councils.5 
However, the system attracted considerable criticism. One problem was that it was 
vulnerable to being used for petty or politicised complaints, potentially wasting 
public money on unnecessary investigations. Subsequent reforms therefore gave 
local standards committees and monitoring officers responsibility for filtering 
complaints in an effort to focus the system’s resources more strategically.6    
Although it is difficult to assess the impact of the reforms on conduct, research 
suggests that ethical issues were taken more seriously in local authorities in the 
years after the changes above were introduced7.
4.  ‘Nolan Committee’s Third Report 1997’, http://public-standards.gov.uk/Library/OurWork/3rdInquiry_
summary.pdf, [Accessed  22 February 2013]
5.  Committee on Standards in Public Life, Standards Matter: A review of best practice in promoting good 
behaviour in public life, 14th Report Cm 8519, January 2013.
6. The role of ‘monitoring officer’ was established under the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.  
This officer is responsible for advising the council on the legality of decisions as well as providing 
guidance to councillors on the council’s constitution and its powers.  The role was established with a 
number of statutory functions, and these were augmented in the Local Government Act 2000 as well as 
by subsequent regulations governing local investigations into members’ conduct. 
7.  Cowell 2011, BMG 2008, BMG 2007
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Bribery
Conflict of  
interest
Collusion
The offering, promising, giving, accepting or 
soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for 
an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach 
of trust. 
Inducements can take the form of gifts, loans, 
fees, rewards or other advantages (taxes, 
services, donations, etc.)
A situation where an individual or the entity 
for which they work, whether a government, 
business, media outlet or civil society 
organisation, faces a conflict between the 
duties and demands of one or more positions 
that they hold and their private interests.
A secret agreement between parties, in the 
public and/or private sector, to conspire to
commit actions aimed to deceive or commit 
fraud with the objective of illicit financial gain. 
The parties involved are often referred to  
as ‘cartels’.
In March 2013, East Devon County councillor 
Graham Brown was suspended from the East Devon 
Conservative Party after claiming to undercover 
reporters posing as overseas investors that he could 
obtain planning permission in return for payment.  
Mr Brown, himself the owner of a planning 
consultancy business, was filmed telling newspaper 
reporters that, “I don’t come cheap. If I’m turning a 
greenfield into a housing estate and I’m earning the 
developer two or three millions, then I’m not doing it 
for peanuts – especially if I’m the difference between 
winning and losing it”. Cllr Brown vehemently denied 
the claims and stated that his duties as a councillor 
were appropriately declared and “completely 
separate” from his business role.9
In 2004, former leader of Lincolnshire County 
Council Jim Speechley was imprisoned for 18 
months for misconduct in public office, after 
seeking to influence the council decision on the 
route of a new bypass so as to divert it through 
his own land, increasing the land’s market value. 
He failed to publicly declare his personal interest 
in the route until the police were brought in to 
investigate some 18 months later. 
In 2009, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) imposed 
penalties on 103 companies worth a total of £129.5 
million after an investigation into bid-rigging during 
the 2000-06 period. Competitors in the construction 
industry had colluded in bidding for building contracts, 
meaning that their customers – many of whom were 
local authorities – were at risk of being overcharged.
Most of the offences involved ‘cover pricing’, where 
bidders arranged for competitors to put forward high 
bids intended to mislead clients about the level of 
competition. In eleven instances, the OFT found the 
lowest bidder faced no genuine competition at all as 
all other companies involved in the tender had put 
down cover bids. In six instances, money changed 
hands between the firms, with the successful bidder 
paying ‘compensation’ amounting to £60,000 to its 
unsuccessful rivals.
The investigation was sparked in 2004 by a complaint 
from an NHS auditor in Nottingham. It uncovered 
evidence of cover pricing in more than 4,000 tenders 
involving more than 1,000 companies. Kier Group 
was fined £19.9 million, Balfour Beatty £5.2 million 
and Carillion £5.4 million (for contracts tendered by 
Mowlem, which it had acquired in 2006).
Type of  
corruption
Definition8 Example of proven or alleged 
corruption of this type in UK  
local government 
8.  Most definitions are taken from the Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide, Transparency International, Berlin July 2009.
9.  BBC News Devon, ‘Councillor Graham Brown suspended over planning claims’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-21739780.
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Cronyism or  
nepotism
Gifts &  
Hospitality
Lobbying
Fraud
Form of favouritism whereby someone in public 
office exploits his or her power and authority 
to provide a job or favour to a family member 
(nepotism), friend or associate (cronyism), 
even though he or she may not be qualified 
or has not gone through the appropriate 
application procedures.
The provision of gifts, entertainment or other 
hospitality that could affect or be perceived to 
affect the outcome of business transactions 
and are not reasonable and bona fide.11 
Any activity carried out  by companies, 
associations, organisations and individuals to 
influence a government or institution’s policies 
and decisions in favour of a specific cause or 
outcome. Even when allowed by law, these 
acts can become distortionary if influence is 
disproportionate or non-transparent.
To cheat. The act of intentionally deceiving 
someone in order to gain an unfair or illegal 
advantage (financial, political or otherwise).
Reported allegations in 2013 surrounded a council 
leader in the North West of England that had replaced 
the planning committee Chairman, allegedly, because 
the committee had failed to approve a development 
that would have benefitted the council leader’s 
long-term friend. The replacement Chairman had 
previously supported developments put forward by 
that same development company, led by that same 
individual with close links to the council leader.10 
In 2011, the Managing Director of Mayflex 
alleged that his firm had been treated unfairly 
when bidding for a Birmingham City Council 
library contract. Birmingham’s hospitality register 
recorded the council Chief Executive, Stephen 
Hughes, having accepted extensive hospitality 
from the winning bidder, Capita-led Service 
Birmingham, including dinner and overnight 
accommodation at Billesly Manor hotel, tickets 
for a concert at Symphony Hall and a dinner 
at Cardiff city hall. However, Birmingham City 
Council dismissed the complaint that it broke 
procurement laws and, following an investigation, 
the Chief Executive (himself) concluded that the 
council had acted properly. 
In March 2013, the Telegraph newspaper secretly 
recorded Cllr Greg Stone, who was employed 
by planning lobbyist firm Indigo Public Affairs, 
claiming to know “the tricks of the trade” needed 
to help a planning application succeed for 
development projects. He also told undercover 
reporters that many fellow employees at the 
planning consultancy also worked as councillors. 
Cllr Stone denied any wrongdoing.12 
In May 2012, Ross Knowles, head of energy 
procurement for the Local Authority South East 
Region, an organisation known as LASER which 
buys gas and electricity for Kent County Council 
(KCC) and 120 other local authorities, was convicted 
of fraud. Knowles had asked British Gas to add an 
extra charge to their contract as a “comfort blanket”, 
which would be reclaimed by KCC and LASER at 
the end of the year. However, instead of claiming a 
rebate, he forged invoices and diverted the money to 
his own bank account, for a personal gain of around 
£400,000. 
Type of  
corruption
Definition Example of proven or alleged 
corruption of this type in UK  
local government 
10.  http://www.chesterchronicle.co.uk/news/chester-cheshire-news/suspensions-lead-crisis-cheshire-west-6060431
11. Transparency International (2009), Business Principles for Countering Bribery.
12.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9921008/Councillor-explains-tricks-of-the-trade-for-planning-approval.html
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Revolving Door
Vote rigging
Abuse of  
authority 
or trading  
in influence
An individual who moves back and forth 
between public office and private companies, 
exploiting information or connections gained 
in government service for the benefit of 
companies.
Abuse of power to influence council decisions 
and policies with a view to affecting voting 
behaviour. While this may not involve tangible 
personal benefits for the individual exercising 
influence, the benefits are ‘private’ in that they 
accrue to the political party or group rather 
than serving the public interest.
Abuse of knowledge of council in exchange for 
personal benefits.
The late Sir Simon Milton, an influential figure in local 
government politics and former Chairman of the Local 
Government Association, founded the UK branch 
of a US lobbyist firm in 1995. In 2000, as leader of 
Westminster Council, he claimed to have left the 
firm in order to focus on his work at the council and 
to pursue personal business interests. However, he 
failed to declare the same lobbyist firm remained a 
listed client of his. He also claimed that the lobbyist 
firm had a policy of not undertaking any work relating 
to Westminster Council, however clients of that 
firm went on to win major development planning 
permissions from Westminster Council.13 
In the 2004 Birmingham local elections, more 
than 1,500 votes cast were subsequently 
identified as fraudulent, relating to six seats. The 
scheme exploited weaknesses in postal ballots, 
with councillors handling unsealed postal ballots 
in a deserted warehouse “vote-rigging factory” in  
the city.15 
In March 2013, Elmbridge Borough council planning 
committee member and paid planning consultant, 
Cllr David Archer told undercover reporters that he 
was the go-to man for securing planning approval. 
He explained that he could not argue in favour of 
a development at planning committee if he was 
advising the project, but indicated there might be 
other ways he could help, saying “There’s more than 
one way to skin a cat”. In April the council Audit and 
Standards Hearings Panel found Cllr Archer breached 
the Member Code of Conduct and he stood down 
from his post on the planning committee.14  
Type of  
corruption
Definition Example of proven or alleged 
corruption of this type in UK  
local government 
 
13.  Private Eye Issue: 1173, pg.13 2006
14.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9920986/Surrey-councillor-and-planning-consultant-They-call-me-Mr-Esher.html
15.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/west_midlands/4406575.stm
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2.      INHERENT CORRUPTION RISKS
In 2014, total public spending is projected at £712.9 billion, of which 24% is spending 
by local government.16  With control of around one-quarter of total public spending, 
increasingly distributed through outsourced contracts to private providers, local 
government is inherently exposed to corruption risk. We identify twelve key risk areas: 
1. public procurement at needs assessment stage;
2. public procurement at bid design stage;
3. public procurement at award stage;
4. public procurement at contract implementation stage;
5. control and accountability over outsourced services;
6. the revolving door of personnel between local authorities and private companies 
bidding to provide services;
7. planning discretion and influence regarding ‘permissions to build’ decisions;
8. planning discretion and influence regarding ‘changes of use’ decisions;
9. failure to enforce section 106 agreements;
10. the conflict of interest where councils make planning decisions about property  
they own;
11. collusion in housing fraud or deliberately ineffective monitoring of housing fraud; and
12. manipulation of electoral registration.
2.1 THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCESS
Public procurement, which often involves high-value and complex transactions 
with lucrative opportunities for corruption, is inevitably vulnerable to cronyism, and 
favouritism as well as outright bribery. It is difficult for anyone without considerable 
knowledge and expertise of the area to hold those involved accountable.17  
Whistleblowers tend to play an important role in identifying possible instances of 
corruption in public procurement, since they are best placed to know enough about the 
details and complexity of contracts to identify suspicious behaviour. 
Local authorities have always bought, or procured, goods and services from the private 
sector, but in recent years they have increasingly used private-sector providers to 
deliver services which they formerly provided themselves with their own employees, 
equipment and facilities. Sometimes the contractors are entirely separate companies, 
perhaps with a long history of providing such services in the private sector. On other 
occasions, the companies have been established because of the opportunity provided 
by local authority outsourcing and they might hire across a whole cohort of staff from 
the council to do the job. These structural changes have altered the powers and 
responsibilities of members and officers, with a potential impact on the opportunities to 
engage in corruption. 
16.  See www.ukpublicspending.co.uk 
17.  Ware, G., Moss, S., Campos, E, (2007) ‘Corruption in Public Procurement: A Perennial Challenge’ 
(2007) in Campos J.E, S. Pradhan (ed.) (2007) The Many Faces of Corruption, Washington DC, The 
international Bank of Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank www.igac.net/pdf/publications_
adb_manyfacesofcorruption.
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Local government accounted for 63% of total public sector outsourcing in 2012, a 
7% rise from 2008, with the total value of council contracts let to the private sector 
increasing by 140% to £12.9bn over the period 2008-12. Nearly half of waste 
management services in local government are currently outsourced, amounting to 
contracts worth £1.13bn, while more than 20% of council transactional finance, human 
resource and payroll services are outsourced.18 According to some estimates, public 
sector outsourcing could be worth £101bn by 2014-15.19 
2.1.1 The impact of procurement corruption 
When public officials corruptly subvert the correct process to award contracts not on the 
basis of merit or price but motivated by the promise of personal gain, the consequences 
may be costly and dangerous. As well as meaning that taxpayers get poor value for 
money, corruption in procurement can mean that infrastructure is built to poor safety 
standards and services are delivered unfairly or to an inferior quality. Meanwhile, firms 
offering better value services may be pushed out of the market if they repeatedly fail to 
win contracts.
2.1.2 The procurement cycle: needs-assessment, bid design and award phases 
The procurement cycle has five main stages, each of which brings different types of 
corruption risk.20 In the needs-assessment phase, the local authority assesses its need 
for goods or services, makes a decision on what to purchase and prepares a budget 
for the planned purchase. Corrupt individuals can manipulate the system by falsely 
inflating needs, or deliberately skewing the cost estimates or provision for errors. In the 
bid-design phase, the tender documents are prepared, specifying the requirements, 
including any conditions regarding quality or safety standards. Corruption can occur if 
requirements are drafted so as to favour or disadvantage particular suppliers, if unclear 
selection and award criteria are used, or when non-competitive procedures (such as 
exaggerated emergency) are invoked without proper justification. 
 
Case study:  Procurement fraud in the South East
In May 2012, Ross Knowles, head of energy procurement for the Local Authority 
South East Region, an organisation known as LASER which buys gas and 
electricity for Kent County Council (KCC) and 120 other local authorities, was 
convicted of fraud. Knowles had asked British Gas to add an extra charge of £0.04 
per unit of energy to their contract as a “comfort blanket”, which would be reclaimed 
by KCC and LASER at the end of the year. This was said to be a ‘float’ balance to 
iron out any price fluctuations. Andrew Penhale, CPS Central Fraud Group said, 
“At the year-end reconciliation, instead of claiming a rebate which would have 
benefited all the public services that were part of the consortium, he forged invoices 
and diverted the monies to his own bank account.”Knowles received a personal 
gain of around £400,000.21 
18.  Localgov.co.uk, ‘Outsourcing boom in local government, says report’, 1 February 2013.
19. The Guardian, ‘This obsession with outsourcing public services has created a shadow state’.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/07/public-sector-outsourcing-shadow-state [Accessed 25 
March 2013]
20.  See Transparency International (2006) Handbook on Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement – 
Experiences from Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan; and Heggstad, K., M. Froystad and J. Isaksen (2010) 
The Basics of Integrity in Procurement, Version 3, Christian Michelsen Institute.  http://www.cmi.no/file/?971
21.  Kent Online, ‘Energy boss Ross Knowles jailed for seven years for fraud’, 3 May 2012.  http://www.
kentonline.co.uk/kentonline/home/2012/may/3/council_boss_ross_knowles_jail.aspx
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During the award phase, a procurement notice is published, bidding documents are 
issued and proposals are requested. Bidders submit their proposals to the procurement 
officer, who subsequently evaluates all proposals and decides on the award of the 
contract. Corruption can include the drafting of evaluation criteria to favour – or 
emphasize the weaknesses of – a particular supplier, failure to give adequate public 
notice (benefiting insiders), collusive bidding, soliciting offers known to be inferior to a 
favoured supplier, accepting late proposals or rejecting legitimate proposals, or making 
biased decisions at the evaluation stage.
Bid-rigging proven in construction contracts
In 2009, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) issued £129.5 million’ worth of penalties 
to 103 companies after an investigation into bid-rigging during the 2000-06 period. 
Competitors in the construction industry had colluded in bidding for public-sector 
building contracts, meaning that their customers – many of whom were local 
authorities – were at risk of being overcharged.
Most of the offences involved ‘cover pricing’, where bidders arranged for 
competitors to put forward high bids intended to mislead clients about the level 
of competition. In eleven instances, the OFT found the lowest bidder faced no 
genuine competition at all as all other companies involved in the tender had put 
down cover bids. In six instances, money changed hands between the firms, 
with the successful bidder paying ‘compensation’ amounting to £60,000 to its 
unsuccessful rivals.
The investigation was sparked in 2004 by a complaint from an NHS auditor in 
Nottingham. It uncovered evidence of cover pricing in more than 4,000 tenders 
involving more than 1,000 companies, although the OFT was forced to focus on 
instances where the evidence was strongest. Kier Group was fined £19.9 million, 
Balfour Beatty £5.2 million and Carillion £5.4 million (for contracts tendered by 
Mowlem, which it acquired in 2006).
In order to reduce the risk of corruption and ensure the best value for money for 
the community, strict guidelines have been developed around these stages of the 
procurement procedure. These are intended to ensure that contracts are awarded 
on a truly competitive basis under a system that is transparent, efficient, fair and 
accountable. A competitive process is widely recognised to lessen integrity risks 
because it removes – or at least reduces – the opportunity to engage in favouritism 
towards friends and family. Competition also increases the transparency of the process, 
creating pressure to explain any apparent irregularities either in the tender process or 
in the subsequent delivery of the services, such as evidence of low-quality results or 
abnormally high prices. 
The needs-assessment, bid design and award phases of procurement are relatively 
tightly regulated nowadays, not least because of the EU Directive on Public 
Procurement, which determines the types of procedure that must be used for contracts 
of a certain value, sets out the number of quotes that must be solicited, and ensures the 
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competitive nature of the process in other ways.22 These regulations apply to the whole 
public sector and create a strong framework for local government procurement (at least 
for contracts that are above the EU threshold for scrutiny; contracts below the threshold 
are much less subject to scrutiny and hence probably more vulnerable to corruption). 
However, there are reasons for concern that internal controls in these areas are 
weakening. Although local authorities typically have professional in-house procurement 
teams that are experts in the pre-tender and tender process, and the procurement 
process is further monitored by the internal audit team which can check processes and, 
if necessary, call in particular tenders for closer scrutiny or recommend re-tendering, 
these teams are vulnerable to spending cuts. Moreover, changes to the audit regime 
mean that it will be more difficult for the public to gain access to information about 
services delivered by private providers in future.
2.1.3 The procurement cycle: contract implementation phase 
Moreover, research suggests that the contract implementation phase of the 
procurement process – in which the winning bidder must provide the agreed goods and 
services according to the conditions and timing agreed in the contract and the local 
authority should monitor the fulfilment of the contract – is much less tightly controlled 
than the earlier phases. Corruption can arise if favoured sub-contractors are not held 
accountable, or the use of sub-standard goods is overlooked, or if a corrupt company 
and corrupt supervising official collude to agree on price increases or changes in 
specifications.
There is a key weakness in the governance of this area because the contract 
implementation phase is often managed by the local authority department which uses 
the procured goods or services, rather than by the central procurement function. This 
department may be unaware of the precise terms of the contract and may not notice if 
corners are cut. One procurement expert noted, 
“There might be a disconnect between a procurement department that does this 
first part [pre-tender and tender] and the ‘client’, for example, the council’s IT dept. 
It is the IT department that is supposed to monitor the contract, and see how it is 
performing, but the disconnect reduces accountability. The supplier might be able to 
provide sweeteners to the IT department to re-negotiate the contract without going 
back through the procurement department.”[Interview 18]
Another procurement expert argued that relatively few resources are devoted to contract 
management:
“The central functions in local authorities often focus on contract letting and not 
contract management. Many of the same skills are involved, but less resources 
are devoted to contract management. And departments are often left to manage 
contracts – raising risks not just of corruption but also of inefficiency.”  [Interview 22]
Contractors often make their profit by bidding low and then negotiating variations – 
including increases in the price or the use of cheaper inputs – across the life of the 
project:
“…the number of variations – that’s where people make money. The profit is often 
determined by the award of work under the framework contracts, particularly where 
the pricing basis is not clearly defined, so that you can end up with charging for 
extra work by hourly rates.”[Interview 22]
22. More information is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm
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There is a risk that the local authority’s procurement team could collude in that strategy. 
If contracts are written with a view to such re-negotiations of terms and rates, or with 
provisions for charging extra for unforeseen eventualities or errors, this may be corrupt. 
One construction-sector executive noted, 
“The sharp operator in terms of the outsourcing contractor company will have 
agreed a contract based on a lump sum, invariably based on a local authority 
which, at the time that the contract was let, was much larger. If you have a company 
which provides HR, IT and admin, where can it make its savings?  If they are 
prepared to make the investment, they can usually make significant savings for 
themselves, that’s where they are legitimately making some of their profit, but if 
the local authority has downsized over the years, then there is less to provide. So 
if it’s a 20-year contract, every 5 years there is a review and renegotiation based 
around head count. But normally councils are not very good at negotiating soft-side 
deliverables.”[Interview 1]
Local authorities are frequently involved in high-value, complex, long-term 
procurements, where monitoring is inherently difficult and likely to involve many 
discretionary judgements on the part of officers and members. High staff turnover and a 
lack of project management expertise also lead to weaknesses in personal responsibility 
and accountability for major projects. A lack of control over major projects can lead to 
cost overruns and delays, but can also mean that it is difficult to detect instances of 
corruption. Some authorities clearly struggle to manage such large-scale contracts, as 
this example from Wirral demonstrates (see box overleaf). 
2.1.4 Does outsourcing reduce accountability? 
When services are outsourced, local authorities retain a statutory obligation to ensure 
that all of the rules that would have applied to them are equally followed by the external 
providers. However, the extent to which that obligation is fulfilled varies. Overall, the 
route for making complaints may be much less clear to members of the public, and 
there are concerns that local government officers do not adequately monitor contract 
performance or respond to complaints. Councils sometimes seek to claim that decisions 
made by contractors on long-term contracts are beyond their control. Without the Audit 
Commission to exert pressure and with the decline of local investigative journalism, 
there is a risk that corruption in this area will become more common. The Institute for 
Government’s 2012 report, Commissioning for Success, argues that decisions about 
when to outsource need to be made on a more robust basis, that monitoring and 
stewardship of outsourced services needs to be strengthened, and that accountability 
arrangements need to be clarified.23 
In theory, competition should exert discipline on companies to perform and provide 
for accountability, because competitors have an incentive to scrutinize the fairness 
of procurement processes and the performance of their competitors. However, the 
outsourcing market in the UK is dominated by five large firms. This has led some to 
argue that the companies are effectively an oligopoly, and are not subject to the stiff 
competitive pressure that would facilitate accountability.24  Commercial confidentiality 
further inhibits scrutiny of their work. Information about services provided by local 
23.  Blatchford, Kate and Tom Gash, ‘Commissioning for success: how to avoid the pitfalls of open public 
services’, Institute for Government, 2012.
24.  Social Enterprise UK, The Shadow State, 2012; available here: http://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/
uploads/files/2012/12/the_shadow_state_3_dec1.pdf
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Wirral Council –Highways and Engineering Services contract
In June 2012, a Public Interest Report by the Audit Commission on Wirral Council’s 
letting of a contract for the provision of highway and engineering services raised 
concerns about conflicts of interest and weak governance in the procurement 
process. 
The successful contractor had quoted and confirmed rates for some elements of 
electrical work for street lighting and traffic signs that were only 2% of the average 
of the other contractors’ estimates. The council’s Contract Evaluation Team had 
queried the rates but subsequently accepted that they were genuine and did not 
report the issue to senior officers or elected members. After the award of the 
contract in October 2008, a dispute emerged with the contractor arguing that the 
council was responsible for making payments, over and above the rates tendered, 
directly to a sub-contractor. In October 2010, the council paid out an additional 
£640k to the sub-contractor – an amount which had not been taken into account 
in the original tender. Moreover, the council then agreed a contract variation 
to increase the rates to include the higher costs to the sub-contractor for the 
remainder of the contract, a further cost increase of £855k. Even with the additional 
£1.495m, the overall cost was below that of the next lowest bidder. However, the 
Audit Commission found that “the subsequent variation to the rates for electrical 
works casts doubt on the robustness of the tender evaluation process”.
Although corruption was not proven, the Audit Commission found considerable 
evidence of conflicts of interest and governance failures:  
• A meeting held in the pre-tender period between the council’s director of 
technical services, another council officer and a representative of a contractor, 
in which the contract and sub-contract arrangements were discussed, was in 
contravention of council procedures.
• The director of technical services failed for some time to declare his relationship 
with the contractor’s representative.
• The declaration of interest that was eventually made was incomplete and 
inconsistent with other evidence. 
• The required approval for contract variations from the relevant council cabinet 
member or committee had not been obtained, and the interim director had 
ignored explicit advice from Internal Audit to report the largest variation to elected 
members.
• Internal Audit had rated the level of assurance for the contract as 3-star (good) 
despite identifying a number of high-priority risks and recommendations in key 
areas of the contract management and monitoring systems.
• The council’s response to an anonymous whistleblower regarding a significant 
claim against the council by the contractor was inadequate.
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government in-house teams is subject to Freedom of Information Act requests, but 
private-sector companies that provide outsourced services are not automatically 
covered by the Act. The public’s ability to hold local government to account for 
outsourced services depends on what is covered by the contractual relationship, where 
the Freedom of Information Act does apply. This is not always sufficient to allow full 
scrutiny of service provision. The contract might, for example, narrowly define the 
information to be treated as held ‘on behalf of the local authority’, thus limiting the 
public’s right of access to information.25 
2.1.5 Transparency risks  
Transparency is key to increasing accountability in procurement. Indeed, some 
corruption might have been uncovered more quickly – or indeed deterred – if there was 
more transparency around public procurement. For example, the construction cartels 
benefited from the opaque environment surrounding procurement at the time. In an 
effort to improve transparency, the Localism Act requires local authorities to publish 
details of all spending activity over £500. There is a hope that this will make it easier 
Allegations of corruption in outsourcing: the case of SouthWest One
In September 2012, Iain Liddell-Grainger MP levelled accusations of corruption at 
SouthWest One, an outsourcing joint venture between Somerset County Council 
and IBM. Southwest One was set up in 2007 to carry out back-office tasks for 
Somerset council, Taunton Deane Borough Council, and the Avon and Somerset 
police. But Liddell-Grainger claimed, in a parliamentary speech in which he was 
protected by parliamentary privilege, that the deal will lose the council £13.7m over 
five years.
SouthWest One took legal action against Somerset County council after the 
Council complained that it was not delivering promised savings. The contract 
dispute came to an end with an out-of-court settlement in July 2013 in which 
Somerset paid £5.9million to the company, instead of the £25 million plus costs bill 
that it would have faced if it had lost. 
In his September 2012 speech, Liddell-Grainger accused the councillors and local 
government officers, who agreed the £500m deal with IBM in 2007, of corruption. 
He said Somerset officials had been “reckless” in signing the deal and its 
councillors had been “dim” and tired when the contract was signed at 2am.
It was that, or “The only other explanation is that palms were being greased, 
“according to Liddell-Grainger.26
25.  See comments by Lord Wills, made in the debate on the Local Audit and Accountability Bill, 24 June 
2013, column 199; http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/130624-gc0001.
htm#13062411000219.
26. See the debate at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2012-09-18a.827.0&s=liddell-
grainger+and+greased#g829.0  and ‘Southwest One contract dispute cost council £5.9m’, BBC News, 17 
July 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-somerset-23339493; andSouthWest One accusations of 
corruption aired again by local MP’, Public Technology, 20 September 2012 http://www.publictechnology.net/
news/southwest-one-accusations-corruption-aired-again-local-mp/37174.
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for civil society to scrutinise public spending, potentially adding an informal avenue for 
detecting corruption.   
However, greater transparency over public spending can be a mixed blessing. It also 
brings the risk of increased fraud by ‘armchair fraudsters’ or organised criminal groups. 
For example, the publication of supplier invoices led to an increase in fraudulent 
requests whereby offenders telephoned a local authority pretending to represent the 
supplier and asking the authority to change the details of the bank account into which 
payments were made. Fortunately, the National Anti-Fraud Network (NAFN), which 
acts as a hub for the collection and circulation of intelligence alerts on fraud against 
Local Authorities, was able to alert other authorities to this fraud relatively quickly. Such 
intelligence sharing is vital to countering fraud and organised crime, but it requires 
institutional support. 
Overall, transparency remains an essential part of a robust system for holding local 
government to account, but the unintended risks that it raises should be taken into 
consideration and external fraud controls, as well as internal corruption controls, need to 
be robust.
2.2 REVOLVING DOOR RISKS
Local authorities increasingly outsource the provision of services that they would once 
have provided internally. Frequently, the new supplier of those services also hires local 
authority employees to carry out the job. This makes sense, in that the expertise about 
how to provide a service in a certain locality is maintained and there is greater continuity 
in service provision, which should benefit residents. One executive from a service-
providing company praised the benefits:
“We have taken on management contracts and taken in-house the employees. It 
was a great source of really talented people. They brought great understanding of 
local government and they’ve been able to translate that into work that we’ve been 
doing for local government in different parts of the country.”[Interview 1]
However, it also creates a risk of corruption.  If local authority employees abuse their 
access to insider information or their ability to shape policy or contracts whilst in office in 
order to create opportunities for themselves, their friends, or for private-sector companies 
for which they will later work, this is corrupt.  In addition, it might have consequences in 
terms of services being provided at low quality or poor value for money.  
The transfer of individuals from government to private-sector roles, sometimes known 
as the ‘revolving door’, has been associated with many apparent conflicts of interest at 
the national level.27 Several distinct types of conflict of interest can arise:
1. Abuse of office. An official might use his or her power while in office to shape a 
policy or decision in favour of a certain company, with a view to ingratiating himself 
or herself with that company and thus opening up a path to future employment. 
The temptation might be exacerbated by the risk of redundancy, providing a greater 
incentive for officers to use their position to build a network with a view to future 
employment.
This type of conflict-of-interest offence is abuse of office – occurring while the 
official is still in public employment. The private benefit accrues to the official, who 
27.  Transparency International UK, Cabs for Hire? Fixing the Revolving Door Between Government and 
Business, 2010.
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gains employment, and also to the company, which secures some kind of privilege 
as a result of the official’s altered behaviour, although companies are increasingly 
concerned about the risks to their reputation of hiring through the revolving door: 
“We’ve been approached by individuals who are retiring from local government but 
don’t want to stop working. They come to us and say they can help us, they have a 
lot of experience. We look at it very carefully and err on the side of caution if we are 
going to be working with that council.” [Interview 1]
2. Undue influence. A former officer now employed by a private company might 
influence his or her former colleagues to make a decision in a way that favours the 
company. In this case, he or she (and the company) is exercising undue influence. 
Undue influence over the formation of policy or legislation in such a way as to 
benefit a certain company or interest group is known as ‘state capture’. 
3. Profiteering. An individual might profit from public office by drawing on information, 
knowledge or stature derived from his or her public role in order to profit financially. 
This profiteering could occur while an official is still in public office or after they have 
left it. 
4. Switching sides. An individual might leave public office to take up employment 
with a private-sector organisation in a role that requires him or her to oppose the 
government’s position on an issue, where he or she had previously represented the 
government. This is known as switching sides. It can be regarded as problematic 
because the individual may have had access to privileged information in 
government, which could now be used to frustrate the government’s aim.
Research conducted for this report suggested that revolving-door type corruption is 
difficult to prove, but may not be uncommon and is certainly creating suspicions which, 
in themselves, undermine public confidence. One respondent explained:
“There are situations where local authority staff end up working for contractors and 
implicit agreements to scratch backs in return for contracts will arise.” [Interview 4]
‘Back-scratching’ might involve the provision of bribes or favours, or the promise of 
future employment or kickbacks from contracts. The research for this report uncovered 
one case where a council officer had written the specification for a tender for a particular 
contract, resigned from the council, and then successfully bid for the contract as a 
private-sector supplier. 
It is very difficult to identify or prove corruption in such cases. Often accountability 
depends on the local press asking questions about why a particular contractor has 
been brought in despite lacking relevant experience etc. However, damage to the 
public interest can occur even if no actual distortion of public policy takes place, but 
simply if the appearance of impropriety exists. This can gravely undermine trust in 
local government and make it more difficult for it to perform its role. It is critical that the 
issue is recognised, that requirements to declare conflicts of interest are observed, 
and that individuals are immediately removed from related work once a move to the 
private-sector is planned. Remaining staff could also be put on notice to take care 
in dealing with individuals who will transfer from being their in-house colleagues to 
being employees of a bidding firm, and could be required to log all contact with such 
individuals in the same way as meetings with outside firms are recorded.
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2.3 DISTORTED PLANNING DECISIONS
Local authorities’ power to grant planning permission can make them vulnerable to 
corruption from developers who stand to make large profits from building retail outlets 
or business units. Alternatively, councillors themselves may seek to benefit directly from 
buying land and distorting associated planning decisions. Corruption risks are evident in 
several parts of the process.
2.3.1 Applications for planning permission 
Planning officers are responsible for making recommendations to the planning 
committee (comprising elected members) as to whether to approve applications for 
planning permission. In doing so, they should ensure that an application is complete, 
that the plans comply with the law, and that the plans are in line with the area’s planning 
or development strategy. Once a planning officer has made a judgement, he makes a 
recommendation to the planning committee, which makes the final decision. Corruption 
risks may occur in at least three areas in the processing of applications for planning 
permission.
First, planning officers have considerable discretion to make judgements and hence are 
potentially vulnerable to developers’ attempts to exert pressure on them. Interviews with 
experts conducted for this report suggested that it is not uncommon for planning officers 
to be offered bribes, kickbacks and favours in return for facilitating an application’s 
path. They may also be subject to extortion, with corrupt individuals threatening that if 
the officer does not accept a bribe, he or she will nevertheless report them for having 
done so. Research on organised crime suggests that such tactics are a common way of 
drawing individuals into criminal or corrupt activity, and may be particularly effective if an 
individual is already compromised, such as in a scenario where a planning officer had 
accepted hospitality from a developer or had failed to declare an interest.
Second, there is potential for corruption to occur if one or more of the elected members 
on the planning committee seeks to influence the committee’s decision with a view 
to achieving a private gain (for himself or for a third party who has induced him to act 
in such a way). The recent case in East Devon, albeit the result of a sting operation, 
suggests that some councillors are willing to influence planning decisions so as to 
favour a particular developer – or indeed their own company – in return for monetary 
payment. The Bribery Act should allow such instances to be dealt with, although it is not 
always straightforward to find evidence of favours having been provided. Preventing 
such influence is preferable to seeking to punish it after the fact.
Conflicts of interest and revolving door 
An individual who founded the UK branch of a major US lobbyist firm in 1995, moved 
into local government and became leader of a London council in 2000. He claimed to 
have left the lobbyist firm in order to focus on his work at the council and  to pursue 
personal business interests. However, he failed to declare that the same lobbyist firm 
remained a listed client of his. He also claimed that the lobbyist firm had a policy of 
not undertaking any work relating  to that council, however clients of that firm went 
on to win major development planning  permissions from the same council.28   
28.  Private Eye Issue: 1173, pg.13 2006
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Third, in all local authorities, there are some planning permission decisions that can 
be decided at the officer level and do not require committee approval, thus undergoing 
much weaker scrutiny. While in theory only minor decisions concerning low-value 
projects should be delegated in this way, there is no national requirement or standard 
about which types of decision are delegated, and many different degrees of delegation 
exist in different local authorities. Thus, situations might arise where one planning 
officer, perhaps at a low level in the hierarchy, is solely responsible for a decision 
regarding a high-value planning application (he has monopoly power), making him 
vulnerable to attempts to corruptly influence the outcome.
It is important that safeguards are put in place to provide additional layers of scrutiny 
if, for example, a planning committee overturns a planning officer’s recommendation. 
However, corrupt influence is not always easy to spot. Demonstrating that someone has 
been influenced to make a judgement or cast a vote in a particular way is difficult, while 
proving that they have received money or some other benefit in return is even harder. 
Systems for monitoring and detecting corruption should be frequently reviewed and 
should not be overlooked under pressure to speed up the handling of applications.
2.3.2 ‘Change of use’ planning applications 
Another corruption risk in the area of planning relates to applications for ‘change of 
use’. All land under the control of local authorities is categorised as being suitable for 
certain types of usage, such as ‘green belt’ or ‘residential’, but local authorities have the 
authority to grant permission for a change of use. Such change-of-use permissions are 
particularly valuable in the United Kingdom where ‘development gain’ – the increase 
in the value of land as a result of change of use – is not taxable Thus, developers may 
seek to corrupt planning officers or committee members to approve an application for 
change of use.  
2.3.3 Section 106 commitments 
Another corruption risk in planning results from the fact that local authorities are able to 
grant planning permission for the development of land in exchange for agreements – 
known as Section 106s – to provide assets in kind that are beneficial to the community, 
such as schools, social housing, libraries, playgrounds, roads or other transport 
infrastructure. Section 106 agreements are often welcomed by local authorities, which 
otherwise lack the capital to make such investments themselves. However, they are not 
always competently managed once the agreement has been struck, raising concerns 
about corruption relating to the monitoring of such deals – or its absence. In particular, 
local authorities sometimes fail to register the mortgages related to these agreements 
correctly under the Land Registration Act 2002; this constrains the public’s ability to hold 
local authorities to account if a developer fails to fulfil its commitments. Some experts 
Scenario: Councillors abuse power to profit from change of use
Councillors can collude on decisions in an effort to facilitate corrupt gains. Suppose 
that the owner of a rundown hotel requests permission to turn the building into a 
block of apartments. The planning committee rejects the application, but some of 
the councillors then approach the hotel owner and offer to purchase the hotel. He 
agrees. Subsequently, the new owners make another application for change of use 
which is accepted by the planning committee (on which they sit).
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interviewed for this report expressed suspicions that councillors or officers might be 
receiving bribes in return for negotiating Section 106 agreements on terms that are 
favourable to developers at the expense of the public interest, or for not monitoring or 
following up on Section 106 promises. 
Research conducted by Unlock Democracy has found that, while councils in England 
and Wales have entered into commitments related to Section 106s worth around £90 
million, in around two-thirds of cases, they have failed to register the deals with the 
Land Registry.29  This effectively nullifies the agreements. It is very difficult to hold 
local authorities to account in this area because data is held by around 350 different 
organisations and reporting arrangements are not standardised.
2.3.4 Councils as property owners 
The final area where corruption risks arise in the area of planning concerns instances 
where local authorities are in the position of judging planning permission applications 
regarding their own assets. In such cases, there is a risk that they may act in their 
interests as a property owner rather than as a granting entity. In theory, the Secretary of 
State should call in such applications for review, and this certainly happens in the case of 
major big developments. However, smaller cases may slip through the net – for example, 
where a waste development site is developed on council land and the council is a joint 
venture owner of the company which holds the contract for managing the waste. It is 
critical that decisions in such cases are highly transparent and that the rationale behind 
them is clearly set out, making reference to the dual roles of the council.
 
2.4 COLLUSION IN HOUSING FRAUD
Fraud and corruption are often closely related in the area of social housing – for 
example, if a tenant sub-lets social housing, this is technically fraud. However, it might 
become corruption if the estates officer colludes with the tenant to ensure that the 
sub-letting remains concealed. According to 2013 National Fraud Authority estimates, 
tenancy fraud within the local authority-controlled social housing sector costs taxpayers 
around £845 million each year, and affects around 4% of all tenancies in the London 
area and around 2% outside London.30 
The role of local authorities in providing and managing social housing has declined 
steadily in the last 20-30 years as housing stock has been sold to private owners and 
housing associations. Local authorities now provide around 40% of social housing while 
another 10-15% is managed on their behalf. Local authorities have influence over who 
is considered for social housing within their area, and can use the rent collected on the 
homes they own for improvements. 
Officers responsible for allocating housing play an important role in determining which 
applicants are eligible and how quickly they receive a council house. Corrupt individuals 
can abuse their position by accepting cash payments in return for speeding up the 
progress of a candidate’s application, or allocating housing to an individual who is not 
eligible. There have been cases where senior officers have allocated properties to 
themselves – or family and friends – by increasing an individual’s points on the scoring 
29.  Unlock Democracy – unpublished research notes
30. Tenancy fraud in social housing controlled by housing associations is estimated to cost taxpayers £919 
million per year.  Audit Commission, Protecting the Public Purse 2012.
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system by which houses are allocated. Interviews conducted for this research indicated 
that, in some cases, local authorities have known that people were adjusting the points 
and did not necessarily recognise this as fraud or corruption. In more elaborate frauds, 
the individuals submit Right to Buy applications shortly after being allocated a house, 
thereby enabling them to obtain the discount and buy a property cheaply. Such fraud 
might increase following the recent increases in Right to Buy discounts, which have led 
to a major increase in applications.
Councillors can also collude in schemes whereby tenants sub-let to other individuals or 
by overlooking cases of fraud in return for bribes or favours. In one case, former Tower 
Hamlets councillor Shelina Akhtar was found guilty of illegally sub-letting her housing 
association property for £1,000 a month whilst living in private accommodation of her 
own. Organised crime gangs have on occasion been associated with fraudulent sub-
letting, often forcing tenants to move out before sub-letting to fellow criminals and using 
the properties for illegal activity. 
Data matching and analytics are not always effective for detecting fraud and corruption 
in social housing, not least because records about the housing stock and tenancies are 
poor in many areas. Moreover, Housing Associations typically have even less capacity 
to detect fraud than local authorities, and few take part in data-matching exercises 
which can help detect fraud. One more common way of detecting fraud and corruption 
in social housing is through the housing officer or estates officer, accounting for more 
than one-half of detected frauds, according to one study.31  However, these individuals 
tend to have huge monopoly power and little accountability and hence may themselves 
be vulnerable to corruption. One key preventive measure is to rotate estates officers 
so that they take responsibility for different areas at different times, or ensure that they 
work in teams; this is a way of reducing the monopoly power of any one officer and 
hindering the establishment of corrupt relationships between individual officers and 
tenants.
This is another area where a lack of investigative capacity means that there is very little 
knowledge about how much fraud and corruption takes place. According to the Audit 
Commission, in 2011-12, more than half of non-London councils did not detect a single 
tenancy fraud. Targets for service delivery may even disincentivise the discovery of 
tenancy fraud. Councils are required to focus on three targets in housing: fast allocation; 
the collection of rent; and justified need. However, councils have tended to prioritise fast 
allocation and rent collection. This can mean that they have little incentive to investigate 
because fraudulent landlords are ‘good tenants’ in that they pay rent and do not 
demand much house maintenance, for fear of being caught if officials gain access to the 
premises. Research on investigations into tenancy fraud has found that local authorities 
are ten times more likely to detect fraud if they employ specialised staff trained in 
counter-fraud techniques.32 Social housing fraud might also be taken more seriously if it 
were made a criminal offence.
31.  In around one-quarter of cases studied, the detection was the result of a public referral; data-matching 
accounted for less than 10%.  See Bryce, A. 2012. ‘The nature and extent of housing tenancy fraud’, MSc 
Dissertation, University of Portsmouth.
32. Bryce, A. 2012. Op. cit.
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Nottingham City Council – 2009 Public Interest Report 
In January 2009, the Audit Commission published a PIR on Nottingham City 
Council’s provision of accommodation to council tenants between 2003 and 2005. 
Prior to this report, the Audit Commission had released a report in 2006 which 
examined Nottingham City Homes, a management organisation established by 
Nottingham Council.33  The 2006 report identified a number of issues relating to the 
Council’s housing allocation process, describing it as “poorly managed”, “neither 
demonstrably fair nor effectively controlled” and “[lacking] accountability”. Following 
the 2006 report, the Audit Commission was made aware of further claims regarding 
misallocation of council housing in Nottingham. This led to the publication of the 
PIR in 2009. 
The 2009 report focused on two specific areas which had been at the heart of 
recent allegations: the manner in which housing was provided to tenants and the 
practice of council employment agency First Call, in their attempts to hire Housing 
Department staff.34  The report found that, between 2003 and 2005, Nottingham 
City Council had failed to allocate housing in line with its own rules. It exposed 
wide abuse of the housing system, whereby individuals related to or affiliated 
with a councillor had obtained council properties ahead of those in more urgent 
need.35 In addition, this housing was often refurbished and sold on to tenants at 
heavily discounted prices, despite the fact that they were not eligible to reside in 
the properties.36 The report revealed that over the two-year period, 10% of council 
properties in Nottingham had been allocated without regard for the waiting list 
points system. Even housing offers that were made in line with the points system 
were “applied incorrectly by some officers”. With regards to the appointment of 
housing officers, the report also explained how managers often used ‘special 
request’ procedures to avoid the official recruitment process. This resulted in the 
allocation of 38 placements between 2003 and 2005. 
The report concluded that wrongdoing by Nottingham Council was “a reflection 
of failings in the culture, systems and management of the Service”. Housing 
Management was deemed to have failed in its “responsibility to operate proper 
systems of controls”. Senior officers were accused of providing limited information 
to Councillors regarding allocation policies, which in turn prevented them from 
successfully carrying out their duties. 
The report recommended that the council: “put in place adequate and proportionate 
audit arrangements to prevent allocations being made inappropriately in future, 
ensure that the procedures governing manual allocations were operated in a 
proper manner and that adequate records were maintained in support of allocations 
decisions, ensure that procedures prevent inappropriate restrictions on offers of 
housing being entered into the computerised allocations system and ensure that 
mechanisms were in place to require councillors to register any potential conflicts 
of interest when seeking to advocate on behalf of local constituents”.
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2.5 CORRUPTION RISKS IN ELECTORAL REGISTRATION
Electoral fraud is by and large very low in the United Kingdom, and much of it 
represents genuine mistakes, according to a March 2013 report from the Electoral 
Commission.37  Moreover, the Government’s plans to introduce a new system of 
individual electoral registration (IER) in 2014 are likely to further curb the risks of 
electoral fraud.  However, IER also introduces a new corruption risk. This is because 
the new system will require far greater effort by registration officers to maintain the 
register.38 Since central government funding for electoral registration not ring-fenced, 
local authorities – particularly those seeking to make spending cuts – might cut corners 
on electoral registration, either arbitrarily or in order to gain electoral advantage.  
Powerful politicians might seek to ensure that registration officers devote more 
resources to electoral districts where they are likely to benefit from high registration, 
while neglecting less politically supportive or strategically important areas.  Whilst this 
would clearly be corruption, it would be very hard to prove that it was such.
33.  Audit Commission, ‘Report under Section 8 of the Audit Commission Act 1998, http://archive.audit-
commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/SiteCollectionDocuments/PublicInterestReports/pir09nottingham.pdf 
[Accessed 19th February 2013], p.3.
34. Ibid, p.4.
35. This is Nottingham, ‘Nottingham home scandal: Report given to police’,
http://www.thisisnottingham.co.uk/City-council-tenants-let-housing-failure/story-12271956-detail/story.
html#axzz2LL0CxZCD. [Accessed 19th February 2013]
36.  Audit Commission, ‘Report under Section 8 of the Audit Commission Act 1998, http://archive.audit-
commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/SiteCollectionDocuments/PublicInterestReports/pir09nottingham.pdf 
[Accessed 19th February 2013], p.4.
37. http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/news-and-media/news-releases/electoral-commission-media-
centre/news-releases-donations/perceptions-of-electoral-fraud-do-not-match-available-evidence,-study-shows
38.  Electoral registration is entirely the responsibility of local authorities, with no central record kept.  The 
Electoral Commission monitors the accuracy and completeness of the electoral register, but it has no way of 
sanctioning councils which have a poor registration record.
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3.      THE EROSION OF THE  
     AUDIT SAFEGUARD
The new arrangements for audit in England, together with the impact of spending 
cutbacks, raise the potential for the erosion of audit safeguards against corruption.  
We identify eight risk areas where accountability may be weakened:
1. Local authorities have reduced internal capacity to investigate fraud and corruption.
2. The responsibility for investigating and detecting fraud and corruption is being 
delegated to lower-level officers with lesser expertise.
3. Audit committees have been weakened and may disappear because there is no 
longer a statutory requirement for an audit committee to be a full committee in its 
own right.
4. External auditors appointed under the new arrangements may be less able to 
withstand pressure when undertaking investigations or raising concerns about 
suspicions of fraud or corruption.
5. The independence of internal and external audit, and of monitoring officers, financial 
officers and chief executives, is weakened because the Audit Commission no longer 
acts as a backstop or provides support.
6. Powers of public audit have been eroded.
7. The capacity to collect nationwide data on fraud and corruption, or analyse trends 
has been greatly weakened.
8. External audit is not adequately covered by Freedom of Information Act.
3.1 INTERNAL AUDIT AND COUNTER FRAUD DEPARTMENTS WEAKENED BY 
CUTS AND GOVERNANCE CHANGES
Our research suggests that the internal audit function is being weakened because 
local authorities are responding to the need to reduce spending by reducing 
these back-office functions. A recent national survey by the Local Authority 
Investigation Officers Group found a 15% reduction in the number of fraud managers, as 
well as an 8% reduction in senior investigators, a 15% reduction in regular investigators, 
and a 19% reduction in intelligence officers.39 Cutting counter-fraud staff might be 
less politically controversial than cutting frontline services, but it is likely to be a false 
economy in the longer term, since internal auditors will be less able to save the council 
money by identifying fraud and inefficiency. Local government will have significantly less 
internal capacity to investigate fraud from 2014, mainly because of austerity measures.40
A related problem is that the responsibility for investigating and detecting fraud and 
corruption is being delegated to lower-level officers who may have less awareness 
of corruption risks and be less willing to challenge peers and superiors. 
 
39.  Gibbons, Debbie. ‘Research paper 2: The Reducing Counter-Fraud Capability in Local Government 2013’, 
LAIOG, June 2013.
40.  Another reason is the transfer of benefit fraud investigators from LA control to AFIs from April 2014. 
Councils previously used these benefit fraud investigators to tackle some non-benefit fraud issues, including 
corruption.
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3.2 AUDIT COMMITTEES CANNOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE SCRUTINY
We are also concerned that audit committees lack the will or power to fulfil the function 
of reducing corruption risks in many councils. It is not a statutory requirement for an 
audit committee to be a full committee in its own right. In some local authorities they 
are simply sub-committees of other committees. This can mean that risks picked up by 
audit slip through the net and are not adequately considered. Audit committees should 
be committees of the main council, reporting directly into full council to ensure maximum 
scrutiny and accountability of audit findings and recommendations. 
3.3 THE APPOINTMENT OF EXTERNAL AUDITORS
However, our main concerns relate to the changes in the arrangements for external 
audit, which are the main focus of the Local Audit and Accountability Bill. We argue that 
both the current transitional arrangements and the new legislation will constrain external 
auditors from conducting comprehensive investigations, undermine their independence 
and create incentive structures that introduce new risks. 
The critical role of the Audit Commission in detecting and investigating corruption in 
local authorities, by appointing and supporting independent external auditors, was 
eloquently described by Lord Scott of Foscote in a December 2001 speech following the 
Homes for Votes scandal:
Good governance boosts the clout of internal audit 
Internal audit reports to the senior management, the corporate management team 
and to elected members through the audit committee. Reporting to the management 
team can be problematic if suspected corruption refers to conduct by one of the 
members of that team, but any risks in this area can be mitigated as long as there 
are several recipients of the information – hence no one manager has monopoly 
power over information received from the internal audit team. Simon Maddocks, 
Head of Governance at Croydon council, explained “inevitably you’re in a situation 
where you’re dealing with people who are above you in the hierarchy; there is 
potential for them to exert pressure. The saving grace is that there are several 
people and more than one avenue.”
Nevertheless, in a situation where a chief executive exerts informal influence over 
other managers and there is a weak or ineffective audit committee, there is a risk 
that issues raised by internal audit will not be treated seriously. In such a situation, 
the internal auditor must put his own career on the line. Maddocks reflected, “As 
Head of Audit you need to be robust and you need to be prepared to blow the 
whistle and if necessary walk away.”  Several audit professionals interviewed for 
this research had found themselves in such a position at least once in their career. 
However, with the resources for internal audit being cutback and in the absence of 
an institution such as the Audit Commission to set the ‘tone at the top’, individuals 
may feel less able to uphold such professional integrity.
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“When detected and exposed it must be expected, or at least it must be hoped, 
that political corruption will receive its just deserts at the polls. Detection and 
exposure is, however, often difficult and, where it happens, is usually attributable to 
determined efforts by political opponents or by investigative journalists or by both 
in tandem. But, where local government is concerned, there is an additional very 
important bulwark guarding against misconduct. The Local Government Finance 
Act 1982 […] required the annual accounts of a local authority to be audited by 
an independent auditor appointed by the Audit Commission […] [These] statutory 
provisions […] provided an institutional means whereby political corruption 
consisting of the use of municipal powers for party political advantage might be 
detected and cauterized by public exposure.” 41
After the abolition of the Audit Commission, local authorities will be responsible for 
appointing their own external auditors. We are currently in a transitional period, with 
five-year contracts starting from 2012-13 having been let to private auditing firms. The 
contracts have been let at a much reduced rate, representing a 40% cut in the audit 
fees paid by local public bodies.42 However, it is not clear that the cuts will bring better 
value for money for the public. The Government claims that it will save £250 million over 
five years, but this should be weighed against how much money might be lost through 
increased fraud and corruption if the new system proves inadequate.43 Moreover, there 
are concerns that the procurement process for the external auditors prioritised low 
prices over high quality.44 
There is also pressure on local government to reduce the amount that is spent 
through ‘variations’ in the negotiated contract of auditors. Yet such variations can be 
critical where there is a suspicion of misconduct, since the auditor needs to request 
additional resources to conduct an investigation. In the new climate, external auditors 
might consider that it is not worthwhile to investigate allegations of misconduct. One 
interviewee commented,
“As an external auditor, if you suspect that something is going amiss, normally you 
would negotiate a variation in the fee in order to be able to investigate it. But now 
your economic incentive is to turn a blind eye, because the [Audit] Commission 
decides on whether you are allowed the variation, and the Commission is under 
pressure to contain variations in fees. The incentive structures created under the 
new system don’t favour going the extra mile.”[Interview 17]
Together, the cuts and the focus on price competition suggest a worrying tendency 
towards less thorough audits, which might create a more fertile or forgiving environment 
for corruption in the future. Lord Beecham, who served as LGA chair from its inception 
in 1997 until 2004, has called the Bill “bad” and “unworthy”, warning that it will hand 
the large accountancy firms an “effective oligopoly” of local audit.40 The risk is that 
by creating an oligopoly, companies will informally set prices or share out the work 
41. Judgement on Magill v. Porter Magill v. Weeks: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/
ldjudgmt/jd011213/magill-6.htm
42. http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/aboutus/future/pages/timetable-for-outsourcing-process.aspx
43. http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/newsroom/2099373
44. Although the procurement process purported to be 50% determined by price and 50% by quality, the 
scoring mechanism for quality was such that there was little incentive to obtain a score above adequate.  The 
advantage of having an ‘excellent’ score over an ‘adequate’ score was only a six percentage point advantage 
on price.  Hence, if a company that scored ‘adequate’ was 7% cheaper than a company that scored excellent, 
it won the contract. 
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among themselves, reducing competition and its beneficial effects. Another former LGA 
chair, Baroness Eaton, has also criticised aspects of the Bill, arguing that “national 
procurement of external audit is the most efficient way of procuring audit, at the best 
possible cost to local councils.”45
When local authorities are able to appoint their own external auditors, from 2017, the 
independence of auditors may be compromised further. They may feel even less able 
to act without fear or favour, moderating their behaviour with a view to having their 
contract renewed and ensuring that their bill is paid. Auditors may also be deterred 
from undertaking additional investigations for fear that the extra costs incurred will be 
disputed or go unpaid.46
Audit professionals interviewed for this report saw these as serious concerns. One 
commented, “If you come down tough on a client, and it creates ruffles, you’ve got an 
eye to what will happen when it goes to open competition.” [Interview 22]  Another said 
“external auditors now have nominal independence but they will probably feel pressure 
to keep their clients happy so as to avoid losing this contract, future contracts, or non-
audit contracts with the local authority.” [Interview 17]
The Audit Commission also used to play an intangible role in offering institutional 
protection to external auditors, which empowered them to pursue investigations without 
fear of being sued or losing future contracts with local authorities. If auditors complied 
with the Audit Commission’s quality standards, they could carry out a piece of work 
confident that they would not get sued (at least nobody had been successfully sued) 
and confident that they were appointed by the Audit Commission, not the finance 
director of the local authority that they were investigating. 
Several experts interviewed for this research took the view that, in the case of past 
corruption scandals, auditors had only been able to investigate because they were 
appointed by the Audit Commission, rather than the council itself, and benefited from 
the support provided by the Commission. For example, in the Homes for Votes case, 
the auditor John Magill was from a private-sector audit firm, but his independence was 
guaranteed by the fact that the Audit Commission appointed him and supported his 
investigations.47 Under the new arrangements, no institution will provide such support.
An external auditor may be less able to resist attempts to sue the company for opening 
an investigation. In addition to this having a chilling effect on investigations, there is also 
a concern that the increased risk is feeding through into higher fees and increasing the 
price of audit, as auditors need to price in the cost of professional insurance. 
The new arrangements may also generate inequalities in audit services, since auditors 
may start to charge more for providing services to rural local authorities that are distant 
from their head office. While the Local Government Association is seeking to engage 
in group-buying so as to avoid such problems, it once again raises questions as to 
whether the quality of audit will suffer and whether the apparent cost savings will pay off 
when the greater risks of fraud and corruption are taken into account.
45. ‘Former LGA leaders slam Audit Bill’, Public Finance, 23 May 2013
http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/news/2013/05/former-lga-leaders-slam-audit-bill/
46. The Local Audit Bill recently introduced in the House of Lords provides for auditors to recover reasonable 
costs in some circumstances, such as  in considering whether to issue a public interest report. 
47.  The House of Lords judgement panel, when it gave the judgement on the Porter case, included was a 
ringing speech about the independent auditor being the bulwark. 
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3.4 LOW APPETITE AND CAPACITY FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION  
OR COUNTER-FRAUD ACTIVITY
The Audit Commission used to set standards against which local authorities’ counter 
fraud and corruption arrangements were assessed, helping to create national standards. 
However, because the Audit Commission is being abolished, many local councils no 
longer regard these criteria and benchmarks as important.  Local authorities have no 
legal requirement to investigate or measure fraud, and many are seeking to lower costs 
by reducing their internal audit function. 
The Audit Commission previously provided specialist professional skills in counter-
fraud and corruption that were not available to many local authorities, working with 
them to identify risks and encouraging good practice.  With the Commission abolished, 
many local authorities will lack access to such capacity.  Under pressure to cutback 
spending, and with the message from the centre that investigating fraud is not a priority, 
some local authorities will retain very little investigative power.  This could have serious 
implications for the future ability to detect and deter fraud, corruption and organised 
crime.
Moreover, research conducted by the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at Portsmouth 
University suggests that there was a marked decline in the counter-fraud culture in local 
government over the period 2010-12:48   
• 65% of local authorities surveyed indicated that they had a clear programme of work 
to create an anti-fraud culture in 2012, compared to 74% in 2010. 
• 81% of local authorities indicated that they had made it clear that their organisations 
had a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to fraud and corruption in 2012, down from 92% in 
2010.  
This may reflect the fact that the Audit Commission no longer undertakes its ‘Use 
of Resources’ tracking exercise, which monitored counter-fraud resources in local 
government and, by frequently asking local authorities to report on their counter-fraud 
structures, set the standard and the tone for what was expected.  
 
3.5 LACK OF PUBLIC AUDIT
The replacement private regime for the former role of the Audit Commission in England 
is insufficient in a number of ways.49 Private sector audit provides an audit opinion on 
the financial statement of the audited organisation. However, historically, public audit 
has gone further to examine regularity, propriety, probity and value for money as well. 
Neither internal audit teams nor external auditors have the range of powers that the 
Audit Commission had. Ian Carruthers, CIPFA’s Director of Policy, has expressed 
significant concerns about the fact that the Bill does not discuss the wider scope of 
public audit:
48. ‘The resilience to fraud of the local government sector’, Jim Gee, Dr. Mark Button and Dr. Graham Brooks, 
Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at Portsmouth University, http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/
centreforcounterfraudstudies/documents/filetodownload,168551,en.pdf
49. Public audit still exists in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Historically, 
public audit  
has gone 
further to 
examine 
regularity, 
propriety, 
probity and 
value for 
money as well
39
“Although the Bill does provide some clarity on the future shape of local public audit 
in England, one of its worrying features is that the wider scope of public audit is not 
strongly embedded, an omission which might actually serve to weaken rather than 
strengthen public accountability.”50
The police often find corruption difficult to investigate because it is challenging or costly 
to find conclusive evidence.  Under the former regime, Public Interest Reports were 
able to highlight corruption risks and issues, without the need for the detailed evidence 
required by the Crown Prosecution Service. This would often trigger a process of 
internal investigation, leading to public scrutiny and police action where appropriate. 
Auditors can still issue Public Interest Reports, however, following changes in external 
audit in the NHS the numbers of Public Interest Reports reduced dramatically. There 
is now a risk that an external auditor could be sued for undertaking a similar role, 
even if they had the appetite to do it – which they may not because of the commercial 
disincentives.
The Audit Commission also played a critical role in collecting and publishing data, 
allowing it to trace patterns and trends in corruption and fraud. Once it has been 
abolished, we will not have data to know whether councils are detecting more or 
less corruption and fraud, or engaging in better or weaker monitoring and prevention 
activities.51 Simon Maddocks, head of Governance at Croydon Council, commented, 
“The great thing that the Audit Commission had was an overview. […]  They were 
able to identify trends, good practice, specific councils that were out of line. That 
was valuable. It helped identify shortcomings and to raise standards. That is gone  
at a stroke.”
It is often difficult to find evidence that confirms a particular instance of corruption, 
meaning that much corruption could go unprosecuted. However, the Audit Commission 
was able to use public interest reports to reveal misconduct and hence trigger a process 
of media scrutiny and internal investigations which might eventually lead to an officer 
being fired or a member being disgraced. In this way, it played a critical role in policing 
and deterring corrupt misconduct – a role which no institution will provide in the new 
framework. 
Some public-service providing institutions have already been removed from public  
audit in England, for example, foundation schools and hospitals. The emergence 
of high-profile scandals in such organisations suggest that some individuals took 
advantage of the lack of public audit to engage in elaborate schemes of fraud and 
corruption (see box overleaf). 
50. http://www.cipfa.org/About-CIPFA/Press-Office/latest-press-releases/CIPFA-responds-to-Draft-Local-Audit-
and-Accountability-Bill
51. The government is making some efforts to collate anti-fraud intelligence, but the new arrangements are 
much less substantial than under the previous regime.  See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/62522/HMG-Fraud-and-Error-Report-Feb-2011-v35.pdf
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3.6 LACK OF TRANSPARENCY OF AUDIT
A further problem with the new system is that the audit process will be much less 
transparent. Previously, the work of the Audit Commission was covered by the 
Freedom of Information Act and even some information held by external auditors was 
regarded as being held by the Commission in certain circumstances – for example, 
when it was investigating a complaint against a specified auditor, conducting quality 
control of their work, or when it had required an auditor to provide information for the 
discharge of wider Audit Commission functions, such as making judgments on local 
authorities’ use of resources.  This information was also subject to the Freedom of 
Information Act, meaning that it was possible for the public to scrutinise the work of 
external auditors where there were suspicions of misconduct.  
However, no public authority has inherited those responsibilities from the Audit 
Commission, and hence under the new framework, information held by external auditors 
about the activities of local authorities will no longer be automatically covered by the 
Freedom of Information Act, but rather the details of what is covered by the FoI Act will 
Governance Weaknesses in Schools
In 2002, a whistleblower made allegations about governance irregularities including 
nepotism at a high school in Manchester.  Under the audit regime at the time, with 
a district auditor appointed by the Audit Commission, this led to the publication of a 
Public Interest Report in October 2005.  This found that the school had suffered a 
significant “breakdown in appropriate standards of governance and accountability”.   
The district auditor was critical of, among other things, “serious errors of judgement 
made by the head teacher on staffing matters, particularly relating to the role and 
remuneration of her sister” and “payments to staff on termination of employment 
which are contrary to law”, as well as “inappropriate use of school funds”.  
In 2003, Colleen McCabe, headteacher of a London school that had been removed 
from Local Education Authority control, was convicted of fraud and deception after 
using school funds for lavish personal expenditure. 52 Without Local Education 
Authority control, the school had been able to appoint its own auditors, as is the 
case for local authorities under new and proposed arrangements.  The Daily 
Telegraph reported, “police criticised the independent accountants who audited the 
school for six years and failed to notice any irregularities. When the school returned 
to local authority control, the fraud was noticed immediately.”53  
The cases reveal the importance of whistleblowers in revealing inappropriate 
practices, as well as the need for external auditors to be sufficiently independent, 
motivated and resourced to investigate any allegations of misconduct.
52. http://www.lgcplus.com/significant-breakdown-in-appropriate-standards-of-governance-and-accountability-
at-school/521434.article
53. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1440317/Five-years-for-headmistress-who-stole-500000-from-
school.html
54. http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2013-07-15a.549.2&s=corruption#g577.0
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depend on the terms of contracts. Citizens retain a right to gain access to other relevant 
information through the courts, but this represents an unnecessary cost and ultimately a 
barrier to public accountability.  
In the Lords debates on the Local Audit and Accountability Bill, the Government has 
argued that it would be too costly to require Freedom of Information Act compliance from 
external auditors, and that these costs would be passed on to the taxpayer. However, 
Lord Wills has estimated that FoI compliance would cost less than 1% of revenue for 
accountancy firms, whilst potentially bringing major gains to the public interest in terms 
of reduced fraud and corruption.54 Given the dismantling of public audit in England, it 
would be unacceptable if steps were not taken to extend full public accountability over 
the private audit of local government functions and service provision. 
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4.      WEAKENED OVERSIGHT OF   
     ELECTED MEMBERS
Given the erosion of the audit regime, rules and tools to regulate the conduct of  
elected members are increasingly important. Such rules should establish how  
members can use expenses or allowances, how to respond if offered gifts or hospitality, 
as well as requiring them to register interests, disclose potential conflicts of interest 
and, where necessary, recuse themselves from debates or decisions where conflicts 
arise. And to be meaningful, the rules should be enforced. They should be supported 
by a way of monitoring members’ compliance, investigating complaints or allegations 
of misconduct, and imposing penalties on those who violate the rules. The institutions 
responsible for this monitoring and enforcement need significant powers, independence 
and determination to challenge entrenched local power networks that often seek to 
evade scrutiny.
Such institutions were, by and large, established in 2000 and, whilst not always 
working perfectly, were valued by those working in local government (see box overleaf). 
However, since the passage of the Localism Act, the standards framework for local 
government in England has been weakened considerably. We identify eight areas where 
the new system is deficient:
1. There is no longer a universal national code of conduct, although authorities are 
required to have a code based on the Nolan principles. This potentially allows local 
authorities to relax the rules for elected members, creates confusion about which 
rules apply, and sends a signal that the code is less important.
2. There is no longer a specific requirement for members to declare gifts and 
hospitality, and no legal requirement for either a standards committee or the 
monitoring officer to check any register on a regular basis. Such tools are an 
important deterrent to corruption and a significant way for the public to monitor 
potential conflicts of interest.
3. There is no longer a statutory requirement for a council to have a standards 
committee.
4. There is no longer any sanction for members that violate their local authority’s code. 
Again, this is harmful partly because of the signal that it sends that standards are 
not important. Reliance on party discipline to punish misconduct is haphazard.
5. Without Standards for England, there is no national standard-setter, or national 
external body that can investigate allegations of misconduct. This important 
supervisory role is delegated to the local authorities themselves, placing huge trust 
in their ability to self-regulate.
6. Some local authorities may struggle to appoint independent persons of the 
appropriate calibre and legitimacy to perform the new role that has been created 
under the self-regulation system.
7. The system relies too heavily on the new offence of failure to declare pecuniary 
interests, despite serious concerns that the offence is unenforceable and misses the 
point that transparency does not necessarily deter corruption.
8. The ability of chief executives, financial officers and monitoring officers to challenge 
elected members would be compromised by proposals to abolish their statutory 
employment protection and to remove the requirement for a Designated Independent 
Person to investigate in the event of allegations being made about their conduct.
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In England, the tools for regulating the conduct of elected members are assessed to be 
insufficient to ensure accountability and deter corruption. Arrangements for regulating 
the conduct of elected members are different in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
and are unaffected by the Localism Act.
4.1 THE ACCUMULATION OF INFORMAL POWER
Most councillors act with great integrity and generously invest their time to serve 
the public interest, but some of the worst cases of corruption in councils have been 
perpetrated by elected members. Council leaders, in particular, can in certain conditions 
accumulate substantial formal and informal powers, such that officers and fellow 
councillors become reluctant to challenge them. The Committee on Standards in Public 
Life has commented that,
“Past history suggests that problems are most likely in areas with monolithic political 
cultures and correspondingly little political challenge, where partisan rivalry is most 
bitter and tit for tat accusations most common, or in those predominantly rural 
areas with significant numbers of independent members without the benefit of party 
discipline.”55
Council leaders have considerable patronage power, which can facilitate corruption. 
They are able to appoint the members of their cabinet and award chairmanships – all 
roles which bring financial gain for the recipients in the form of ‘special responsibility 
allowances’. This may lead to situations where councillors are unwilling to challenge a 
leader because they fear losing one of these roles, or where they feel obliged to provide 
informal favours, such as offering information or ‘turning a blind eye’ to misconduct.
Old standards framework built public confidence, deterred misconduct, and 
empowered officers…
Recent research has found that local government professionals valued the codes  
and institutions set up under the Local Government Act 2000 for several reasons,  
for example, as ways of building public trust:
“The code of conduct assures the public, the taxpayer and most importantly the voter 
that their councillor is behaving in the way they would hope that they behave” 
“There is value in having a process for investigating and adjudicating on complaints”
“The public wants to know there’s somebody there, minding the shop”
They also saw them as deterrents to misconduct:
“There needs to be a controlling influence. There has to be something in place – 
when the wheels do come off the media have a field day”
55. CSPL, 2013, Fourteenth Report: Standards Matter.
56.  One prosecution was initiated against a council officer, but the case collapsed when witnesses spoke to 
one another.
57. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-politics-12768030
58. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-north-west-wales-19718873; and http://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/
north-wales-news/anglesey-council-future-lie-local-2649365
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Anglesey council:  Eradicating endemic corruption
Misconduct at Anglesey council in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s 
demonstrates how formal and informal power can be wielded in a local community. 
Although none of the councillors were members of established political parties, 
there was an elaborate informal system of patronage in operation. Almost one-
half of the councillors were in receipt of special responsibility allowances, which 
increase the pay of a councillor by around £10,000 per annum. Control of the special 
responsibility allowances translated into control over the council, in a classic conflict 
of interest problem in politics known as the ‘payroll vote’.
However, the informal power network also provided a basis for more elaborate 
scams. Many of the councillors were alleged to have been collectively abusing the 
planning system. Examples of allegations included deliberately rejecting planning 
applications with the intention to buy the (accordingly low value) property and then 
securing planning permission to develop the plot. Similarly, councillors that wanted 
to build a house in the green belt were accused of typically granting permission, 
while most applications from the public were rejected. Such malpractice appears to 
have persisted in a close-knit community where many individuals might have feared 
that drawing attention to misconduct would risk their own livelihoods or status. 
Moreover, early reports into allegations, conducted by a QC and by the Welsh Audit 
office, refrained from naming and shaming individuals, referring only obliquely to the 
behaviour of “senior councillors”.
Despite these allegations, the police did not find evidence of misconduct and no 
prosecutions resulted.56 It is difficult to prove that individuals have been influenced 
to vote in a particular way, particularly if it is not possible to find evidence of money 
changing hands. Most of the councillors were independents and hence not subject to 
party discipline; they also frequently changed groups, making it even harder to hold 
them to account while many held seats that were uncontested – for example, in the 
2008 local elections, seven of the 40 councillors were elected unopposed.
Pressure was eventually brought to bear on Anglesey by the Standards Board and 
the Audit Commission and in 2009, a temporary managing director and a recovery 
board were appointed to oversee the authority. But it took a huge amount of public 
criticism to end the practices. Without these institutions, it is not clear that such 
malpractices will be identified and curbed in the future. 
Moreover, it took a sustained effort over time to turn the council around. Following a 
highly critical report from the Welsh Audit Office, in March 2011 the Welsh Assembly 
Government (WAG) stepped in to remove the powers of elected councillors and 
appointed commissioners to replace them for a temporary period.57   Their powers 
were returned to them gradually over a period from September 2012 until the May 
2013 elections.58 
This was the first time that executive power has been transferred away from elected 
members in the United Kingdom. It is not clear that such an intervention could be 
made in England in the future without the benefit of the Audit Commission to provide 
an independent but authoritative account of misconduct or bring pressure to bear. 
Moreover, the case demonstrates that, even under the old standards framework, it can 
be extremely difficult to investigate and prosecute misconduct by elected members. 
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Homes for votes
Perhaps the most heinous example of corruption orchestrated by an elected 
member in recent history is the Westminster Homes for Votes scandal. While 
dated, the incident is illustrative about the risks of abuse of power and was not 
finally resolved until the 2001 Law Lords case concluded. 
In 1987, Westminster Council, led by Shirley Porter, the Conservative leader of the 
council, devised a policy of manipulating the sale of council houses in marginal 
wards in an effort to improve the Conservative Party’s chances in the next local 
elections.60 The designated properties were sold at heavily discounted prices to 
tenants in areas perceived to be favourable to the Conservatives.
In 1989, at the request of Labour councillors, Porter’s housing policy was referred 
to District Auditor John Magill to verify its legality. The extent of corruption was 
finally exposed by Magill in 1996 after thorough investigations.61 Magill accused 
Porter and five others on Westminster City Council of “wilful misconduct” and 
“disgraceful and improper gerrymandering”, estimating the cost to Westminster 
Council at more than £30 million. At the time, Porter and Weeks could be held 
individually responsible for their misconduct and sanctioned with the ‘surcharge’, 
through which the local authority could reclaim its losses.
In 1997, three judges ruled that Magill was correct in his assertion that Porter and 
her deputy, David Weeks, were liable for the surcharge, which was decreased to 
£27 million. However, in 1999, the Appeal Court overturned this decision, clearing 
Porter and Weeks of wilful misconduct and overturning the surcharge. This led 
to Magill taking the case to the Law Lords in 2001, where Porter’s £27 million 
surcharge was reinstated. After much negotiation, Porter eventually agreed to 
repay £12.3 million. 
4.2 REMOVAL OF THE NATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT
Under the Localism Act, local authorities are still required to adopt a code of conduct for 
elected members, but there is no longer a standardised code which applies to all local 
authorities. Local authorities may draft their own codes, as long as they accord with 
the Nolan principles and a short set of criteria detailed in the Localism Act (Section 7, 
Moreover, it was felt that standards frameworks empower officers to hold members  
to account:
“The situation before the [previous standards] framework as an officer was  
that you either colluded with what was going on or you left. Those were the  
two options. If you sought to bang heads together you were thrown out, to put  
it crudely”.59
59.  ‘Comparing standards frameworks’, Teesside University Business School, SBE 088, January 2010; p. 32.
60. The Independent, ‘Dumping the poor’, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/dumping-the-poor-nick-
cohen-unravels-the-homesforvotes-scandal-engulfing-dame-shirley-porter-and-reveals-that-her-successors-
on-westminster-council-are-still-1407226.html. [Accessed  21 February 2013]
61. BBC, ‘Q&A: Dame Shirley’s downfall’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/bbc_parliament/3656465.
stm. [Accessed  22 February 2013] 
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4.3 GIFTS AND HOSPITALITY
Under the Localism Act, there is no longer a requirement for members to declare 
gifts and hospitality and no legal requirement for either a standards committee or the 
monitoring officer to check any register on a regular basis. Councils could thus decide 
to cease requiring gifts and hospitality to be registered. Although there is a new offence 
of failure to declare an interest, it is not specified that a gift or hospitality might represent 
such an interest; it is up to local authorities to define what constitutes an interest. 
Without transparency about gifts and hospitality, there can be no serious scrutiny of an 
important channel through which individuals or interest groups might seek to corruptly 
influence members.  
Confusion over multiple Codes of Conduct
Many councils have chosen to re-write their codes as a result of the changes in 
the Localism Act. The loss of a universal code that applies nationwide threatens 
to create a great deal of confusion over which rules apply and to whom. Take 
the area of Leicestershire. The County Council has re-written its code, partly 
to accommodate the changes in the Localism Act and partly to reflect a recent 
update of the Nolan principles as a consequence of the work of the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life. They have maintained a number of features of the old 
Code, including the definition of pecuniary interests (although authorities are able 
to adopt a new definition if they wish). 
However, many of the other local authorities in Leicestershire have re-written their 
codes in different ways. Authorities with different political complexions have, for 
example, varied in their willingness to embrace the localism agenda by slimming 
down their Codes to a very brief document.62 This variation in Codes becomes 
problematic because so many members have dual mandates. Almost three-
quarters of the County’s members serve on both county and district councils. Some 
also serve on the Fire & Rescue service, a separate authority, and on parishes. 
Thus, one individual might face as many as four different sets of rules pertaining to 
his or her different roles. 
The kinds of dilemmas that might face a dual-hatted member are not insignificant, 
for example, if a member was dealing with a matter where a son/daughter/friend/
business partner has a financial interest, the definition of pecuniary interest might 
differ among different codes, with correspondingly varied implications for how he 
or she should act. The lack of consistency over the rules creates a greater risk 
of confusion and arguably reduces the impact of codes in terms of preventing 
misconduct. 
62. Leicestershire County Council is taking the lead with another eight authorities in trying to arrive at a 
common code.  Yet even if this succeeds, there will be at least three codes in operation in the area.
paragraph 28). The criteria include the need for the authority to have provisions in place 
to investigate allegations and to have rules on declarations of pecuniary interests, where 
failure to declare carries a potential criminal sanction. 
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4.4 REDUCED MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS
The Localism Act has also removed supporting institutions which made it possible to 
monitor and enforce compliance with codes of conduct.
First, there is no longer a statutory requirement for a council to have a standards 
committee. Whereas allegations of misconduct by a member would, under the old 
system, have been referred to Standards for England to conduct its own investigation, it 
is now the responsibility of the council to constitute a member conduct panel, for which 
normal committee rules of political balance apply. Members of the majority party may be 
advantaged in this new system by the fact that the majority of members on any panel 
investigating their conduct will be their political allies. One monitoring officer commented 
that, “this instantly causes party politics to be played.”[Interview 20]
Second, there is no longer any sanction for members that violate the non-criminal parts 
of the code. They cannot, as was previously the case, be suspended from office for 
violating the rules set out in the code. The only formal sanction for violating the code 
is now censure, which is far less likely to deter misconduct. The absence of sanctions 
sends a signal that the code need not be taken seriously. 
In cases where allegations of misconduct arise repeatedly and are extensively covered 
in the press, political parties sometimes threaten to impose sanctions through de-
selection or a vote of no confidence. Even the threat of such actions can prompt an 
individual to resign (see box below). However, party discipline is unreliable for several 
reasons, for example:
• Parties may not wish to draw attention to their own members’ misconduct, since this 
could damage the party’s reputation;
• Different parties may have different expectations of their members;
• Not all councillors are members of political parties; and
• Parties might abuse the power to de-select and seek to remove a member for 
political reasons. Party discipline is not a substitute for formal sanctions imposed as 
consequence of a formal investigation.
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Resignation of Leicestershire County Council Leader David Parsons
In July 2012, after nine years in office, Leicestershire County Council leader 
David Parsons resigned from his position amid controversy concerning his travel 
expenses to EU meetings.63 He had been accused of failing to repay money that 
he had spent to fund his travel to Brussels, where he stood on the Committee of 
Regions.64
The standards committee found that Parsons had violated the code of conduct 
four times with regards to honesty, integrity, accountability and leadership. The 
committee revealed that, although Mr Parsons was authorised to claim expenses 
for his Committee of Regions trips to Brussels, he had failed to reimburse East 
Midlands Council as was expected. In addition, the Committee outlined how Mr 
Parsons had refused to change the manner in which he received funds from 
East Midlands Council, despite the Chief Executive strongly advising him to do 
so. Finally, the Committee found that Mr Parsons’ uncooperative behaviour in a 
previous investigation had hindered its progress, and noted his failure to register an 
interest in his consultancy firm Probert-West.65
Despite finding clear evidence of code violations, the recent reforms meant that 
the Standards Committee no longer had the power to dismiss Mr Parsons from his 
position. The Committee instead issued a statement expressing strong disapproval 
for his actions, required him to write a letter apologising for his breaches of conduct 
and sent him on a training course on standards and ethics. 
Eventually, the Conservative group announced a vote of no confidence in Parsons, 
prompting him to resign from his position. However, the party only took this 
step when Parsons’ reputation had become badly damaged by extensive and 
sustained media coverage of both the allegations and the evidence uncovered by 
the standards committee. Under the new standards framework, it is questionable 
whether such allegations against a leader would even have been investigated, for 
several reasons:
• A Chief Executive in the same position in future might be less willing to 
challenge council leader if his/her position is not subject to statutory protection. 
The same would apply to the Monitoring Officer. 
• The majority of members on the Conduct Panel, responsible for investigating 
such allegations in future, will be from the same party as the leader and might 
therefore be unwilling to challenge him or her. 
• The new code of conduct might not set out clear rules for the handling of 
expenses and reimbursements.
62. Leicestershire County Council is taking the lead with another eight authorities in trying to arrive at a 
common code.  Yet even if this succeeds, there will be at least three codes in operation in the area.
63. BBC, ‘Leicestershire County Council: Rushton elected as new leader’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-leicestershire-19737973. [Accessed  21 February 2013]
64. This is Leicestershire, Leicestershire County Council leader cost taxpayer £1m in five years, http://
www.thisisleicestershire.co.uk/Leicestershire-County-Council-leader-cost/story-15532448-detail/story.
html#axzz2LWp8tZ29. [Accessed  21 February 2013]
65. This is Leicestershire, ‘Leicestershire County Council leader David Parsons censured over cash claims’, 
http://www.thisisleicestershire.co.uk/Leicestershire-County-Council-leader-David/story-16420523-detail/story.
html#axzz2LWp8tZ29. [Accessed  21 February 2013]
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4.5 REPLACING A NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTION WITH LOCAL 
INDEPENDENT ADVISERS
Previously, local standards committees were supported by a national body, Standards 
for England, which had a mandate to ensure that elected members were held 
accountable for misconduct. Critics argued that the institution was too frequently 
drawn into trivial, personal, or politicised disputes, becoming overburdened and often 
embroiled in lengthy investigations that yielded little. 
However, Standards for England played an important role as a national standard-setter, 
providing clarity on what was expected from elected members. Moreover, its status as 
an external and national body meant that it had greater authority and independence 
to judge the conduct of senior members and council leaders than local standards 
committees, whose independence might well be compromised by the reliance of 
committee members on political support from the individuals under investigation. 
In the absence of a nationwide standards body, it is much more difficult for anyone 
to raise concerns about the leader of the council. The Localism Act provides for a 
substitute to fulfil this role. In the event of any allegations being made about misconduct, 
local authorities must appoint an independent person to advise as to whether the 
standards committee should open an inquiry. This assumes that local authorities will be 
able to find and appoint a suitably qualified and independent person for this role. Some 
authorities may struggle with finding persons of the appropriate calibre and legitimacy to 
perform the role with care.
The new system also places great importance on the body that recruits the individual 
to this role. The appointments procedure must be independent, and it must meet the 
appearance standard – it must be seen to be independent. Otherwise, the authority 
would be open to accusations that it had fixed the system by appointing a loyal crony to 
this critical role. Again, it is not always easy to find skilled and independent individuals to 
sit on such a panel. The Committee on Standards in Public Life has taken the view that 
the new arrangements are unlikely to be sufficient to “provide assurance that justice is 
being done and, equally important, that it is seen to be done.”66
In Wales, the ombudsman plays a role in regulating the conduct of elected members 
and has been proactive in promoting high standards across councils, as well as issuing 
good guidance. He has avoided the problem of being drawn into investigating vexatious 
complaints by setting a high standard for commencing an investigation. Scotland also 
has an independent body whose remit extends to investigating complaints against 
individual members, the Commissioner for Ethical Standards in Public Life.67
However, the English Ombudsmen will not fill the gap left by the Standards Boards. 
Their remit focuses on the corporate behaviour of the council and its adverse impact on 
individuals, but in England there is no other external body responsible for regulating the 
conduct of individual councillors. This appears to leave an important gap in the English 
system, not least because research suggests that the public is more inclined to trust a 
more centralized body to undertake investigations, seeing them as more impartial and 
objective than more localized solutions.68
66. Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2013.Fourteenth Report: Standards Matter, p. 55.
67. Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2013.Fourteenth Report: Standards Matter, p. 56.
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Scenario:  Misuse of council resources for political purposes
Suppose that one political group on the council uses council offices for a party 
political meeting ahead of elections. Such behaviour is unlawful, but might not 
be investigated by the local council itself, particularly if the dominant party was 
responsible. Previously, this could have been reported to the Standards Board for 
investigation. Under the new system, the only external body that can investigate 
is the police, who seem unlikely to spend time on such a relatively minor – albeit 
important – matter.
4.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON THE NEW CRIMINAL OFFENCE
The Localism Act introduces a new criminal offence for one specific type of misconduct, 
failing to declare or register a pecuniary interest. It is punishable with a fine of up 
to £5,000 and disqualification from office for up to five years. The Government has 
described this as the key mechanism by which it will “ensure that corruption in local life 
is prevented”.69 Councillors should declare that they have an interest before a relevant 
debate or decision occurs, and may decide to recuse themselves from the debate or 
decision entirely. They should also register any pecuniary interests in a formal register 
on an ongoing basis, so that the public can check for conflicts of interest after decisions 
have been taken. This transparency enables the public to trust elected members to take 
decisions on the basis of merit. 
There is, by and large, a strong culture of declaring interests in local government. 
However, a number of recent scandals suggest that some councillors are failing to 
declare interests, either because they are unaware of the rules or because they seek 
to deliberately contravene them. Interviews conducted for this research revealed one 
case where a councillor had failed to declare that he stood to inherit property from 
a developer whose application for planning permission he was judging, and another 
case where a councillor had failed to declare that his daughter stood to benefit from 
a planning permission decision in which he was involved. The Speechley case (see 
box overleaf) also demonstrates that sometimes, when councillors fail to declare an 
interest, it is because they hope to gain corruptly from the conflict of interest that they 
are seeking to cover up.
68.  Comparing standards frameworks’, Teesside University Business School, SBE 088, January 2010, p. 21.
69. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-reforms-will-stop-town-hall-corruption-and-culture-of-malicious-
complaints--2
70.  BBC News, ‘Former council leader is jailed’, 2 April 2004; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/
leicestershire/3594421.stm
Conflict of interest in the Speechley case
In 2004, former leader of Lincolnshire County Council Jim Speechley was 
imprisoned for 18 months for misconduct in public office, in relation to an incident 
where he sought to influence the route of a new bypass so as to divert it through 
his own land, increasing the land’s market value. He failed to declare publicly his 
personal interest in the route until after the police were brought in to investigate 
some 18 months later.70
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However, while the new offence seeks to address an important risk of corruption, it is 
almost certainly inadequate for the purpose. There are three problems:
1. Narrow definition. The definition of disclosable pecuniary interests is drawn 
very narrowly. Critically, it does not apply to a member’s relatives, other than his 
or her spouse or civil partner. Although this does not mean that members face 
no accountability for decisions taken in matters where a son, daughter, friend or 
business partner has a financial interest, since the decision would still be subject to 
judicial review, it does mean that the offence has no purchase on this important set 
of potential conflicts. 
2. Weak enforcement. The capacity for enforcing the law – detecting, investigating 
and punishing violations – will be very weak under the Localism’s Act new standards 
framework. While in the past the external auditor might have conducted a Public 
Interest Report, the new system for appointing external auditors will compromise 
their ability and willingness to take on such a role (since it might reduce their 
chances of having their contract renewed, winning work elsewhere, or getting paid). 
The Monitoring Officer could conduct an initial investigation, but again, his or her 
independence will be compromised by the loss of statutory employment protection. 
Whereas the Audit Commission might have previously provided support and an 
external sounding board for the Monitoring Officer, once it is abolished, no institution 
will exist to fulfil that role. 
In England, this leaves the police as the main body able to investigate. Yet there 
are serious reasons to doubt that the police will devote resources to investigating 
possible violations or that the Crown Prosecution Service will consider it worthwhile 
to prosecute. The police may not be able to justify an investigation as a good use 
of their limited resources. One senior local government expert described the likely 
lack of will to investigate on the part of the police as “the main hurdle to this [new 
offence] being effective” [Interview 2]. The police’s capacity to investigate fraud 
and corruption has in general declined considerably in the current era of spending 
cuts. Moreover, the magnitude of corruption and fraud at the local government 
level involves financial amounts that the police often consider insignificant. If 
the allegations are severe, the potential crime is likely to be a more serious one, 
such as bribery or mal-administration. In Scotland, a country-wide Public Sector 
Corruption Unit has been established within Police Scotland to prioritise corruption. 
In comparison, no such dedicated and coordinated investigative resource for 
corruption exists in England.
3. Transparency alone does not prevent corruption. By focusing on the declaration 
rather than actual conflicts, the offence misses the point. Transparency can 
only reduce the risk of corruption if there is adequate scrutiny of registers and 
declarations and if members are held to account when conflicts become apparent. 
Rules about transparency and disclosure should ideally help the public to assess 
whether corruption has occurred. However, for this, a register is insufficient. Proper 
scrutiny requires that the details of the interests and relationships involved in any 
apparent conflict can be investigated, and that requires the cooperation of a number 
of supporting institutions. If these institutions or the individuals occupying them are 
themselves conflicted, or their independence is compromised by informal alliances 
or power structures, then it can be very difficult to establish the facts of a case. The 
example described below illustrates some of these difficulties.
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The case reveals the difficulty of assessing whether corruption has occurred, but also 
the inadequacy of simple transparency arrangements, such as declarations of interest, 
in the face of complex informal power networks. In order to deter corruption and build 
public confidence in the integrity of local authorities, transparency rules should allow the 
public to scrutinize council decisions and check that due process has been followed. 
Declaration without investigation in a local authority
The following scenario was derived from interview testimony. The case concerns a  
small unitary local authority where one political party had been very dominant for  
nearly a decade. The council owned a local leisure institution whose management  
was contracted to a private company. It emerged that the management company  
had awarded thousands of pounds of business to another local company, which was 
owned by the Lead Member for Leisure, who happened to be the individual with  
primary responsibility for the first company’s management contract. 
The councillor concerned had declared an interest and followed the requirement to  
leave the room when the first company’s management contract was discussed. 
Moreover, there was nothing necessarily wrong in the councillor winning business  
from the company. Councillors are not paid a salary and they need to earn a living. 
However, it was clear that the appearance of a conflict of interest could undermine  
trust in the councillor’s impartiality. There remained a suspicion that the councillor  
might have influenced his colleagues in their decision about awarding the contract to  
the management company. Such influence might not have been overt or even intended. 
The councillor was very powerful in his local party and arguably exercised a great deal  
of informal power over his colleagues, simply because they all had an interest in 
maintaining good relations with him. Moreover, even if the councillors had all behaved 
entirely properly, the management company might have improperly sought to curry favour.
In this case, the best way to scrutinize the councillor’s conduct, with respect to their 
relationships with the private sector, and to allay any concerns would be to ascertain 
whether a proper procurement process had been followed – for example, to ask whether 
the management contract was put out to tender and, if so, how many companies 
were invited to tender, and on what grounds was the contract given to the company 
associated with the councillor.
However, the public was ill-equipped to investigate these questions. The management 
company, as a private company, was not governed by the Freedom of Information 
Act and hence was under no legal obligation to provide details of the contract with 
the councillor’s company. The chief executive of the council conducted only a cursory 
investigation, and only after sustained pressure. Once again, this raises a suspicion 
that the chief executive was compromised in his judgement, not necessarily by explicit 
influence or collusion, but simply because he has a strong interest in maintaining good 
relations with the elected members, particularly those in the dominant ruling group. 
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Bribes for Planning Permission in East Devon?71
In March 2013, Conservative councillor Graham Brown was suspended from 
the East Devon Conservative Party after making claims to undercover reporters 
posing as overseas investors that he could obtain planning permission in return 
for payment. Mr Brown, himself the owner of Greygreen Planning Ltd, a planning 
consultancy business, was filmed telling Daily Telegraph reporters that,
“I don’t come cheap. If I’m turning a greenfield into a housing estate and I’m 
earning the developer two or three millions, then I’m not doing it for peanuts – 
especially if I’m the difference between winning and losing it”. 
This led to allegations that Mr Brown was abusing his position as a councillor 
to benefit his business interests. These claims were vehemently denied by Mr 
Brown, who stated that his duties as a councillor were appropriately declared 
and “completely separate” from his business role. However, his comments were 
deemed to have brought his office and authority into disrepute, resulting in his 
suspension from the party. 
Following Mr Brown’s suspension, his case was referred to East Devon District 
Council’s Standards Committee and its Monitoring Officer, Denise Lyons, to 
investigate whether his actions had violated his councillor code of conduct. Shortly 
after Mr Brown’s suspension from the Conservative Party he resigned from his role 
on East Devon Council.72 He stated that his resignation was not a result of any 
unlawful activity but was rather due to “unbearable media pressure”.73 Following 
his departure, the Council reported that Mr Brown’s remarks had been referred to 
Devon and Cornwall Police as a possible violation of the 2010 Bribery Act. 
Time to change the rules about what interests can be held? 
Perhaps it is not just greater transparency and accountability that we need, but stricter 
rules about the interests that members can hold whilst in office. A recent scandal in East 
Devon (see box) raises questions as to whether it is advisable for elected members 
to be allowed to simultaneously earn income from employment or consultancies, for 
example. 
71. BBC News Devon, ‘Councillor Graham Brown suspended over planning claims’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-england-devon-21739780.
72. ‘Former councillor Graham Brown resigns as the chairman of the East Devon Business Forum’, This is 
Devon http://www.thisisdevon.co.uk/councillor-Graham-Brown-resigns-chairman-East/story-18424282-detail/
story.html#axzz2Nt843Kv3
73.  ‘Councillor resigns after secret filming’, ITV, http://www.itv.com/news/westcountry/story/2013-03-11/east-
devon-councillor-denies-cash-for-planning-influence/
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4.7 ABOLITION OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
Council leaders can be extremely powerful individuals, able to appoint members to 
positions of special responsibility, exercising influence through the party over who 
gets selected to stand in elections, and sometimes holding office for long periods 
unchallenged. This means that council leaders often have great monopoly and 
discretionary power, while accountability is weakened by the fact that people around 
them may be disinclined to challenge their authority. The consequent risk that council 
leaders will be involved in corruption is underlined by research findings that misconduct 
often involves the leadership of local authorities. For example, research on nine local 
authorities found that 
“in those case studies which had experienced ongoing conduct issues, and large 
numbers of complaints under the code, we found that the leadership was often 
involved.”74
In addition, 
“in those councils where leaders had neglected issues of conduct […] member-
to-officer relations were often poor, and this created a difficult environment for 
monitoring officers and other senior managers to address councillor conduct or 
attract respect.”75
It is therefore essential that key personnel among the officers – such as the 
Chief Executive, the Chief Financial Officer and the Monitoring Officer – have 
the independence to scrutinise the conduct of leaders of local authorities and the 
confidence to challenge them if necessary. To this end, several important officer roles 
in local government have statutory protection, meaning that it is not possible for council 
members to decide to fire them without an external investigation by a designated 
independent person. These protections have been in place since 1989. In terms of 
central administrative functions with responsibility for ensuring professional standards of 
conduct and investigating allegations of misconduct by senior officers, there are three 
roles to which this applies:  
• the Chief Executive, who is responsible for a number of probity issues relating to 
appointments; 
• the Chief Financial Officer or Section 151 Officer, who is responsible for financial 
probity and audit; and 
• the Monitoring Officer, who is responsible for standards of conduct.76
However, the Government in January 2013 launched a consultation on removing that 
statutory protection, threatening to make these roles much less independent and more 
vulnerable to political, social or personal influence.77 The DCLG consultation included 
a proposal to remove the requirement for a designated independent person (DIP) to 
74. Cowell, 2011, p. 445
75. Cowell, 2011, p. 445
76.  The same person cannot hold more than one of these roles. 
77.  See 12 March 2013 letter from Joanna Killian, Chair of the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives 
and Senior Managers (SOLACE), to Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Eric Pickles 
Letter http://www.solace.org.uk/press/SOLACE_Letter_to_Eric_Pickles/#sthash.9fN3HtYo.dpuf
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investigate allegations of misconduct by senior officers. This would see the removal of a 
key defence for senior officials from dismissal without referral to an independent review. 
As of writing, we have found no further information published by the government on this 
important issue. 
Rob Whiteman, incoming Chief Executive of CIPFA, has argued that this could radically 
alter the relationship between senior council officials, elected council members and the 
public, and has raised major concerns about the implications of the proposal:
“What the change would achieve is a dilution of good governance and an 
erosion of the long-held duty of the chief financial officer within local authorities 
to represent the interests of the ‘rate payer’ by speaking truthfully and robustly to 
council members when they have reason to believe the policies being pursued are 
financially unsustainable. Without that safety net, it will place pressure on many 
CIPFA members to think twice before giving their considered advice in the public 
interest without a fear of dismissal by the administration of the day for so doing.”78
Our research suggested that this statutory protection and the requirement for DIPs 
to investigate allegations are particularly valuable for Monitoring Officers, who do not 
necessarily have high status in the administrative hierarchy, 
“Statutory protection gives you the psychological confidence to act independently 
of their political masters. You are like an independent watchdog within the authority. 
Monitoring Officers generally have the respect of members and members comply 
with what they say. But statutory protection helps their status within the organisation. 
This [proposed change] is a further weakening of the role. […]Without this [statutory 
employment protection], the MO will feel less secure. There is a lot of professional 
judgement involved about how you take something forward. It is important that the 
MO feels confident, independent, supported.”[Interview 6]
SOLACE has staunchly criticised the proposal, arguing that the removal of this 
protection will reduce openness and transparency across local government, inhibit the 
raising of governance concerns, increase the cost of senior officer disputes to the local 
authority and taxpayer (from employment-related challenges), and compromise the 
ability of these roles to perform effectively and independently, which is given significant 
importance in the DCLG Accounting Officer Accountability Statement. 
The move may also reduce the “already limited attraction” of a career in local 
government, according to SOLACE, particularly in councils which are already struggling 
or have a history of difficult political relationships. Such councils will therefore struggle 
to recruit to key posts and may have to resort to appointing either inadequate staff or 
experienced but expensive interim staff on short-term contracts. 
78. See http://opinion.publicfinance.co.uk/2013/09/local-government-dont-ditch-the-dips/#sthash. 
0YGvzA02.dpuf
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Understanding the risks: How might past cases have unfolded?
Joanna Killian has commented that,
“It is unlikely that successful criminal proceedings for corruption, as in the 2004 
Lincolnshire County Council Councillor Speechley case, would have been 
successful if employment protection was not afforded to the Chief Executive or 
Monitoring Officer”79
David Bowles, Chief Executive of Lincolnshire County Council at the time when 
council leader Jim Speechley’s misconduct was revealed, recalls that both 
the public interest report from the auditor and the criticism from the Standards 
Board were critical to convincing the police to investigate. Although there had 
previously been many allegations of bullying and harassment, and evidence that 
Speechley had short-circuited the decision-making process, Speechley’s party, the 
Conservatives, did not seek to intervene or discipline him. Even when the auditor 
and the Standards Board found evidence of misconduct, the party did not act, 
and the Chief Executive was powerless to remove Speechley, because he was an 
elected member. It was essential to bring in the police to investigate the allegations 
that he had influenced a council planning decision to site a road in a different 
location so as to increase the value of his own property. 
As Chief Executive, Bowles called in the external auditors to conduct a public 
interest report – in this case, the auditors were a private company, KPMG, 
appointed by the Audit Commission. Bowles reflected, 
“When I did this, I had statutory employment protection, which meant that if 
the members wanted to get rid of me, I would be protected. If they try to sack 
you a designated independent person would be brought in to investigate and it 
would make it far more difficult, although they could always do deals, pay-offs. 
But they knew that if they went down that route, all of the information would 
come out. The person appointed as the outsider would have to be appointed in 
agreement with the minister. So the statutory employment protection was very 
important security for me.”
79.  Ibid.
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5.      GUARDIANS OF  
     ACCOUNTABILITY? VOTERS,   
     WHISTLEBLOWERS AND  
     JOURNALISTS
With the weakening of so many of the institutions for holding officers and members in 
local government to account, the role of the electorate, local government employees 
(potential whistleblowers) and the media in scrutinising their conduct becomes ever 
more important. However, these channels of accountability need to be strengthened  
if they are to fill the gap.
Local democracy and citizen accountability were major themes in the Government’s 
local government reform programme. Indeed, research by Transparency International 
indicates popular support in the UK for the fight against corruption. In 2013, the Global 
Corruption Barometer found that 67% of UK respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption.80   
In the same survey, 91% of UK respondents declared that they would do at least one 
out of a number of options to report or address a corruption issue if they found one. 
However, the low quality and accessibility of open government data, as well as time 
pressures on local residents, work against the opportunity for citizens to provide a 
powerful check against corruption or monitor fraud risks. The investigative capacity  
of citizens and civil society groups is generally very low.
 
5.1 ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY
While the ultimate source of accountability in local government is the ballot box, an 
informed choice requires both information on the issues, which is reduced under the 
new arrangements, and genuine choice among candidates, which does not exist in  
a number of local authorities given the prevalence of one-party councils and 
uncontested seats.  
One-party councils. There are a number of councils in the United Kingdom where 
only one political party is represented on the council or is highly dominant – such as 
Newham in East London and Mosley in Merseyside are 100% Labour, while Bracknell 
Forest has 40 out of 42 councillors from the Conservative Party.  The number of such 
one-party councils is also on the increase, particularly in the north of England where the 
decline of the Liberal Democrats sometimes means that there is very little opposition 
to Labour.  This creates a situation where there is much reduced accountability: the 
actions of councillors are not subject to the degree of scrutiny and criticism that would 
otherwise be provided by the opposition party. 
There used to be a high number of one-party councils in central Scotland, which were 
troubled by organised crime. Some commentators argue that the change to a more 
proportional electoral system has helped to change the dynamic. For example, in 
80.  UK respondent data from http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_barometer_2013
In 2013, 
the Global 
Corruption 
Barometer 
found that 
67% of UK 
respondents 
either  
agreed or 
strongly 
agreed that 
ordinary 
people can 
make a 
difference 
in the fight 
against 
corruption
58
Glasgow city, Labour traditionally won around 90% of the seats until the introduction 
of proportional representation in 2007. Labour’s share of seats then dropped to 57%, 
still leaving it with a comfortable majority. However, when a scandal subsequently 
emerged involving the Labour council leader, the threat of electoral competition arguably 
prompted the new Labour leader to clean up his party’s act. He de-selected around one-
third of the party’s councillors and made efforts to bring in new talent.81
Uncontested seats. Electoral accountability is unlikely to be effective in situations 
where there is no competition for a particular seat; when the seat is uncontested. In the 
2011 local elections, this was common in local government in England and Wales. In 24 
local authorities, at least one in 10 councillors were elected unopposed. The proportion 
rose as high as one-half of winning councillors in Eden District Council in Cumbria. In 
some wards of Eden, local elections have not been contested since 1997, and there 
are other wards where opposition is very weak.82 Such a lack of accountability provides 
ideal conditions for corruption. Moreover, some argue that the pattern may be the result 
of corrupt collusion among candidates from different parties to distribute the wards 
among themselves.
Eden
East Dorset
South 
Northamptonshire
Waverley
North Kesteven
Ryedale
Wychavon
Rochford
Hambleton
Malvern Hills
St Edmundsbury 
Rutland
Tewkesbury
Derbyshire Dales
South Kesteven
East Devon
Maldon
West Devon
Allerdale
Richmondshire
East Hampshire
Lichfield
East 
Northamptonshire
Ribble Valley
19
12
13
 
16
12
8
11
3
9
8
9
 
5
7
6
8
8
4
4
7
4
5
6
4
4
38
36
41
 
57
43
29
44
13
40
38
45
 
26
38
38
55
59
31
31
56
34
44
56
40
40
50.0%
33.3%
31.7%
 
28.1%
27.9%
27.6%
25.0%
23.1%
22.5%
21.1%
20.0%
 
19.2%
18.4%
15.8%
14.5%
13.6%
12.9%
12.9%
12.5%
11.8%
11.4%
10.7%
10.0%
10.0%
Authority Uncontested  
Seats
Uncontested  
Seats
Uncontested %
Source: Electoral Reform Society
81. http://www.economist.com/node/21553491
82. See Electoral Reform Society, English Local Elections 2011.  Available here: http://www.electoral-reform.
org.uk/publications/
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In addition to some seats being officially uncontested, many other seats are contested 
by only two candidates, or saw parties running ‘paper’ candidates who neither 
campaigned nor expected to win.83 The Electoral Reform Society suggests that a 
change in the electoral system might increase electoral competition. In Scotland, for 
example, the average number of candidates per seat increased from 3.4 to 7.4 between 
2003 and 2007, a period during which proportional representation was introduced. 
 
5.2 WHISTLEBLOWERS
Whistleblowing is one of the main ways of detecting corruption and fraud in both the 
public and private sectors. This is because the employees of an organisation typically 
have much more information and more opportunities to witness misconduct than 
external enforcement agencies. A good framework for whistleblowing can thus play a 
key role in reducing fraud and corruption.
Whistleblowers frequently raise concerns about individuals who are more powerful than 
they are in the organisational hierarchy. If they do not have good internal processes with 
realistic external options for raising concerns, and were not protected by law in doing so, 
they would be disinclined to reveal the misconduct for fear of rebuke or reprisal. In the 
United Kingdom, the 1998 Public Interest Disclosure Act protects whistleblowers from 
victimisation and dismissal, and has formed the basis for whistleblowing in the public 
and private sectors.
Indeed, even with this legal protection, whistleblowers often face high personal costs 
as a result of their actions. Research conducted recently by Public Concern at Work 
(PCaW – a UK whistleblowing charity) and the University of Greenwich analysed 1,000 
calls to PCaW’s whistleblowing advice line. The study found that, of the 40% of callers 
who reported receiving a response to their actions, in one-fifth of cases the individuals 
were subsequently dismissed. A further 21% of those who received a response 
experienced some form of informal reprisal, including ostracism by co-workers, verbal 
harassment or unreasonably close monitoring by superiors. These forms of retaliation 
often result in individuals leaving their jobs, suffering stress and anxiety as well as 
isolation. Whistleblowers can often find it difficult to gain new employment in the same 
sector. 
Whistleblowing is only effective if there is an appropriate culture of support for 
whistleblowers, as well as the legal protection. It is therefore cause for concern that the 
PCaW research found that, of all those surveyed, “those working in local government 
have the lowest expectations that the wrongdoing will be stopped and that the 
investigation will be satisfactory throughout the process of raising a concern”.
Local authorities need to put in place clear procedures for disclosing suspicions of 
misconduct, risk or malpractice internally; tools such as whistleblowing reporting and 
advice lines that are independent and can protect the identity of the person raising the 
concern, together with a supportive culture, in which individuals in the organisation see 
that they are encouraged to speak up and, when they do, they are protected and their 
concerns are taken seriously and acted upon.
 
83. http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/blog/the-best-of-the-worst-of-2011s-local-elections
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5.3 THE MEDIA
The local media has in the past been a powerful force for accountability in local 
government, both through investigations to uncover corruption and by exerting pressure 
on local authorities or political parties to respond to corruption allegations. However, 
the local media is in decline, weakening this form of public scrutiny. Just between May 
2008 and May 2009, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) documented the closure 
of 60 local newspapers and more than 1,500 job losses in local newspapers, while a 
2010 Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee inquiry into the future of the media 
heard evidence that up to half of 1,300 local media titles were likely to close between 
2010 and 2015. This appears realistic given that, in 2012, it was estimated there were 
only 1,100 local newspapers left in the UK.84 Circulation of local newspapers dropped 
by one-quarter between 2007 and 201285, with all but two regional dailies seeing a 
year-on-year drop in circulation in the second half of 2012.86  And with advertising 
revenues in freefall87, there are also risks that the scrutiny function of local press may 
be compromised, with journalists being unwilling to criticise local authorities or local 
companies because they rely on them to buy advertising. 
Moreover, in recent years, Freedom of Information requests have often been the 
primary tool for local media investigations, as was the case for BBC Radio Leicester 
and corruption allegations around Leicestershire County Council Leader David Parsons. 
Government suggestions to restrict the Freedom of Information regime are thus also 
cause for concern.88
Social media and various communication applications, in theory, provide an opportunity 
for greater social accountability, citizen awareness and promulgation of concerns 
and, potentially also, user-friendly tools for understanding open public data and 
financial information behind public services. However, the effectiveness of this form of 
accountability as a check on corruption, independent of more traditional media, has yet 
to be proven in practice. 
84. The Economist, ‘local man makes good’, http://www.economist.com/news/21567429-tabloid-cost-cutter-
trying-revive-britains-flagging-local-papers-local-man-makes-good.[Accessed 12 March 2013]
85. BBC News ‘Can local newspapers survive in the internet age?’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-18032555.  [Accessed 12 March 2013]
86. HoldTheFrontPage.co.uk, ‘Circulation drop for all but two UK regional dailies’, http://www.holdthefrontpage.
co.uk/2013/news/circulation-drop-for-all-but-two-uk-regional-dailies/ [Accessed 12 March 2013]
87.  Advertising and circulation revenues fell from £3.1bn in 2004 to £1.6bn in 2010 according to The 
Guardian, ‘MPs like local papers – so what? Saving a dying industry won’t help journalism’, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2012/dec/06/local-newspapers-leveson-inquiry [Accessed 12 March 2013]
88. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217298/gov-resp-justice-
comm-foi-act.pdf
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CONCLUSION
This report identifies twelve areas in which local government is particularly vulnerable to corruption; 
identifies sixteen recent changes that Transparency International believes increase corruption risk for local 
government; and makes twenty-two recommendations that will help to mitigate these risks.
We are aware that local authorities are under pressure financially and that any solutions need to reflect this.  
At the same time, that means it is easy to overlook the threat from corruption in the face of other pressures – 
but this in itself creates the enabling environment for corruption.
Measuring corruption is hard to do, and our research has shown that without further detailed enquiry, it is not 
possible to establish the current scale and prevalence of corruption in UK local government.
Whether current levels are high or low, public concern is high and this matters in itself. A relatively few cases 
can have high impact, and this affects trust in local government and in politics more generally.
Whatever the benchmark levels of corruption at present, this report shows the safety net is being greatly 
reduced.  That may mean a bad situation is about to get worse; or it may mean that we have a proud record 
of fairly low levels of corruption which we are about to throw away.  Either way, the outcome is undesirable.
The cumulative affect of the sixteen recent and proposed changes we have identified, added to other 
trends such as the decline in local media, is to increase corruption risk.  While each individual change may 
be sensible or justifiable in its own right, they appear to have been planned and implemented without an 
overview of their cumulative effect relative to corruption.  
The changes fundamentally erode the powers and independence of the bodies responsible for monitoring 
conduct.  By doing so, they reduce the ability to deter, detect and punish misconduct.  Without proper 
accountability, there is a risk that more members and officers in local government will exploit – and perhaps 
even seek out – opportunities to behave corruptly.  Moreover, one of the greatest aids to prevention is the 
fear of being found out. The new framework removes vital pieces of the local government counter-corruption 
architecture.  The risk of being found out is reduced as a result.
Many of the Government’s recent changes apply only to England.  However, we believe that much of our 
report’s analysis and many of the recommendations are relevant to local government throughout the UK.  
They should also act as a warning signal to other parts of the UK to ensure that corruption risk is assessed 
before making any changes similar to those instituted in England.
Overall, we conclude that the corruption risk for local government in the UK has increased, and that as 
a result corruption in UK local government is likely to increase.  We may not see the consequences for a 
decade.  Many changes, such as those to the audit regime and ethical standards, are recent, and the precise 
consequences are not possible to predict.  However, a lesson Transparency International has learnt across 
the world is that it is better to take notice of emerging risks and to act early, because once corruption takes 
root it can be very hard to eradicate. 
Our key recommendation is therefore: 
The Government needs to review the changes that are taking place in local government to ensure 
that they do not inadvertently create an enabling environment for corruption. This will require – at 
a minimum – a corruption risk assessment, strengthened whistleblowing systems, enhanced audit 
procedures, extension of the Nolan Principles and Freedom of Information obligations to private 
sector services contracted out by local authorities, re-introduction of a common ethical standard and 
a willingness to adjust or amend other recent changes if that should prove necessary.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND 
ACRONYMS USED 
CIPFA  Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
DCLG  Department for Communities and Local Government
DIP  Designated Independent Person 
FoI  Freedom of Information 
IER  Individual Electoral Registration
KCC  Kent County Council
LASER  Local Authority South East Region
LGA  Local Government Association
NAFN  National Anti-Fraud Network 
NFA  National Fraud Authority
NFI  National Fraud Initiative
NHS  National Health Service
NUJ  National Union of Journalists
OFT  Office of Fair Trading
PCaW  Public Concern at Work 
PIR  Public Interest Report 
SOLACE Society of Local Authority Chief Executives
WAG  Welsh Assembly Government 
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APPENDIX 1:  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
REFORMS IN A NUTSHELL
1850:  District Audit function established.
1983:  Audit Commission established by the Conservative Government to regulate  
the audit of local government and NHS bodies.
1996:  The Audit Commission sets up the National Fraud Initiative (NFI), a 
sophisticated data-matching exercise to prevent and detect fraud.
1997:  The Committee on Standards in Public Life reported on corruption in local 
government.
2000:  Local Government Act passed, introducing a framework for improving 
accountability in local government through a set of standards and procedures for 
checking the conduct of members.
2008:  National Fraud Authority (NFA) established.
2010:  Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government announces plans to 
disband the Audit Commission and put in place a new local audit framework.
2011:  The Localism Act receives Royal Assent. 
2012:  Outsourcing of audit of large public bodies to private firms announced in 
transitional phase as part of the abolition of the Audit Commission. The 
Standards Board for England is formally abolished, and all standards matters 
become the responsibility of local authorities. 
2013:  Statutory protections Designated Independent Persons consultation
2013:  August, Local Audit and Accountability Bill passes through to the House of 
Commons, which is due to abolish the Audit Commission and further establish 
the new local government audit regime in law.
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APPENDIX 2:  
KEY CHANGES TO ANTI-CORRUPTION 
FUNCTIONS
Several of the key functions of an effective anti-corruption regime are lacking in the new Localism Act and 
Local Audit and Accountability Bill measures. The table below sets out a summary of the key points made  
in relation to these gaps and provides context information about the role of the mechanisms that were 
formerly in place.
Effectiveness  
of internal 
investigations
Local authorities have no legal requirement 
to investigate or measure fraud, and many 
are seeking to lower costs by reducing their 
internal audit function. 
Targets for service delivery may disincentivise 
the discovery of fraud and corruption, with 
no national audit authority to highlight and 
compare detection rates. 
Evidence received indicates that responsibility 
for investigating and detecting fraud and 
corruption is being delegated to lower-level 
officers with lesser expertise.89
The government is consulting on removing 
statutory employment protection for key council 
officers in safeguard roles.
Audit committees have been weakened and 
may disappear because there is no longer a 
statutory requirement for an audit committee to 
be a full committee in its own right.
Internal audit and counter fraud departments 
weakened by cuts and governance changes.90
There is now a reliance on self-regulation for 
investigations into allegations of misconduct.
• With the resources for internal audit being 
cutback and in the absence of an institution such 
as the Audit Commission to set the ‘tone at the 
top’ and provide support, individuals may have 
less support in withstanding pressure around 
uncovering misconduct. 
• The Audit Commission ‘Use of Resources’ 
tracking exercise formerly  monitored counter-
fraud resources in local government and set the 
standard for what was expected. 
• The Audit Commission also previously provided 
specialist professional skills in counter-fraud and 
corruption that were not available to many local 
authorities. With the Commission abolished, 
many local authorities will lack access to such 
capacity. 
• Effective internal investigations require 
confidence to expose misconduct at senior 
levels. Losing employment protection would 
damage that confidence.
Function Gaps in the Localism Act & Local Audit 
and Accountability Bill regime
Context
89.  Research conducted by the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at Portsmouth University suggests that there was a marked decline in 
the counter-fraud culture in local government over the period 2010-12.  
90.  A recent national survey by the Local Authority Investigation Officers Group found a 15% reduction in the number of fraud managers, 
as well as an 8% reduction in senior investigators, a 15% reduction in regular investigators, and a 19% reduction in intelligence officers.
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Effectiveness   
of external private 
audit
Robust 
and clear 
requirements 
on conduct 
Credible 
sanctions  
for breaches  
of ethics
External auditors appointed under the new 
arrangements may be less able to withstand 
pressure when undertaking investigations or 
raising concerns about suspicions of fraud or 
corruption.
When local authorities are able to appoint 
their own external auditors, from 2017, 
the independence of auditors may be 
compromised by concerns about contract 
renewal and other non-audit services the firm 
supplies the local authority with.
Recent legislation, transitional arrangements, 
and an emphasis on cost-cutting may constrain 
the quality of external audit.
There is pressure on local government to 
reduce the amount that is spent through 
‘variations’ in the negotiated contract of 
auditors. Yet such variations can be critical 
where there is a suspicion of misconduct, 
since the auditor needs to request additional 
resources to conduct an investigation. In 
the new climate, external auditors might 
consider that it is not worthwhile to investigate 
allegations of misconduct.
The new arrangements may also generate 
inequalities in audit services, since auditors 
may start to charge more for providing services 
to rural local authorities that are distant from 
their head office. 
There is no longer a specific requirement for 
members to declare gifts and hospitality, and 
no legal requirement for either a standards 
committee or the monitoring officer to check 
any register on a regular basis. 
Local authorities’ power to suspend members 
as a sanction for poor behaviour has been 
removed. 
There is no longer any sanction for members 
that violate non-criminal aspects of their local 
authority’s code.
The Localism Act introduces a new criminal 
offence for one specific type of misconduct, 
failing to declare or register a pecuniary 
interest. It is punishable with a fine of up to 
£5,000 and disqualification from office for up 
to five years. However, the system relies too 
heavily on this new criminal offence of failure 
to declare pecuniary interests, despite serious 
concerns that the offence is unenforceable.
• The Audit Commission used to play an intangible 
role in offering ‘protection’ to external auditors, 
which empowered them to pursue investigations 
without fear of being sued or losing future 
contracts with local authorities. 
• There are concerns that the procurement 
process for the auditors prioritised low prices 
over high quality. The contracts have been let 
at a much reduced rate, representing a 40% 
cut in the audit fees paid by local public bodies. 
However, it is not clear that the cuts will bring 
better value for money for the public. 
• Audit professionals interviewed for this 
report saw these as serious concerns. One 
commented, “If you come down tough on a 
client, and it creates ruffles, you’ve got an 
eye to what will happen when it goes to open 
competition.”
• Neither internal audit teams nor external auditors 
have the range of powers that public audit had 
to examine regularity, propriety, probity and 
value for money 
• Such tools have been an important deterrent to 
corruption and a significant way for the public to 
monitor potential conflicts of interest.
• The absence of sanctions sends a signal that 
codes of conduct need not be taken seriously. 
• The Local Government Act 2000 had established 
independently chaired statutory standards 
committees for each principal local authority, 
with the power to suspend members for up to six 
months; an independent regulator of local authority 
standards, the Standards Board for England (later 
Standards for England), responsible for overseeing 
the code of conduct, maintaining an independent 
national overview of local investigations into 
allegations against members, and for investigating 
some allegations itself; and a separate independent 
body, the Adjudication Panel for England, to which 
the most serious cases could be referred; this body 
was able to disqualify members for up to five years. 
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Accountability 
Understanding 
and awareness 
of fraud and 
corruption 
The only formal sanction for violating the code 
is now censure, which is far less likely to deter 
misconduct. 
The emphasis in the new regime on party 
discipline is likely to prove unreliable as parties 
may not wish to draw attention to their own 
members’ misconduct, since this could damage 
the party’s reputation; different parties may 
have different expectations of their members; 
not all councillors are members of political 
parties; and parties might abuse the power 
to de-select and seek to remove a member 
for political reasons. Party discipline is not a 
substitute for formal sanctions imposed as 
consequence of a formal investigation.
External audit is not adequately covered by 
the Freedom of Information Act. Citizens only 
have the right to gain access to information 
as defined in individual contracts. Other 
information can be accessed through the 
courts, but this represents an unnecessary 
cost and ultimately a barrier to public 
accountability. 
There is limited evidence of the effectiveness 
of citizen ‘armchair auditors’.
The resource and influence of local press is 
in decline.
The nature of civil society activity on local 
issues is patchy.
The capacity to collect nationwide data on 
fraud and corruption, or analyse trends has 
been greatly weakened.
It is unclear how corruption risks will be 
brought to public debate and to encourage 
police investigations, when they are 
required. The police often find it difficult to 
initiate corruption investigations because of 
a lack of a victim report, and the difficulty 
or cost of finding conclusive evidence – all 
for sums of finance that the police may 
consider small. 
• Previously, the work of the Audit Commission 
was covered by the Freedom of Information Act 
and even some information held by external 
auditors was regarded as being held by the 
Commission in certain circumstances- for example, 
when it was investigating a complaint against a 
specified auditor, conducting quality control of 
their work, or when it had required an auditor to 
provide information for the discharge of wider 
Audit Commission functions, such as making 
judgments on local authorities’ use of resources. 
This information was also subject to the Freedom 
of Information Act, meaning that it was possible for 
the public to scrutinise the work of external auditors 
where there were suspicions of misconduct. 
• The power for local citizens to formally challenge 
the accounts of a local authority have been 
removed. They could previously ask the external 
auditor to investigate financial misconduct and 
issue a public interest report .The auditor had to 
provide reasons to the citizen if he/she decided not 
to take such action and these reasons could also 
be challenged.
• The Audit Commission collected and published 
data, allowing it to trace patterns and trends in 
corruption and fraud. Once it has been abolished, 
it will be difficult to know whether councils are 
detecting more or less corruption and fraud, or 
engaging in better or weaker monitoring and 
prevention activities. 
• Under the former regime, Public Interest Reports 
were able to highlight corruption risks and issues, 
without the need for the detailed evidence required 
by the Crown Prosecution Service. This would 
often trigger a process of internal, leading to 
public scrutiny and police investigations where 
appropriate.
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